The Effects of Emotional States and Traits on Time Perception by Lehockey, Katie A.
THE EFFECTS OF EMOTIONAL STATES AND TRAITS ON TIME PERCEPTION 
by 
Katie A. Lehockey 
July, 2012 
Chair: D. Erik Everhart, Ph.D. 
Major Department: Psychology 
 Background: Leading models of time perception share an important element of 
Scalar Expectancy Theory known as the internal clock, containing specific mechanisms 
by which the human mind is able to experience time passing and thus to function 
effectively within society. A major debate exists in the literature about whether to treat 
factors that influence these internal clock mechanisms (e.g., emotion, personality, 
executive functions such as inhibition, and related neurophysiological components) as 
arousal- or attentional-based factors.  Purpose: The present study investigated 
behavioral and neurophysiological responses to an affective Go/NoGo task, taking into 
account personality correlates related to Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation 
Systems, which are major components of Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory. Methods: 
After completion of self-report inventories assessing personality traits, 
electroencephalogram (EEG) and behavioral recordings of 32 women and 13 men 
recruited from introductory psychology classes were made during an affective Go/NoGo 
task. The task consisted of three phases: 1. A learning phase, during which the 
participants were exposed to a neutral, visual standard duration ten times. 2. A practice 
phase, during which the participants practiced responding and inhibiting to “Go” and 
“NoGo” neutral visual stimuli of varying durations, respectively. For “Go” stimuli, 
 
 
participants’ responses were based on their subsequent comparisons of the presented 
stimuli to the standard via button press (i.e., left button press means “shorter than 
standard duration”, right button press means “longer than standard duration”). 3. A test 
phase, during which participants responded in the same manner as the practice phase, 
but “Go” and “NoGo” stimuli were defined according to positive and negative valence. 
Results: Findings indicated that higher BAS scores (especially BAS Drive) were 
associated with overestimation bias scores for both negative and positive stimuli 
presentation, while BIS scores were not significantly correlated with overestimation bias 
scores. N2 amplitudes were greater in response to “NoGo” stimuli than in response to 
“Go” stimuli. Furthermore, higher BIS Total scores were associated with higher N2d 
amplitudes during positive stimulus presentation for 280ms, while higher BAS Total 
scores were associated with higher N2d amplitudes during negative stimuli presentation 
for 910ms. BAS Drive scores were consistently and strongly correlated with greater 
relative left hemisphere asymmetry. Discussion: Findings are discussed in terms of 
arousal-based models of time perception, and suggestions for future research are 
considered. 
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 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The experience of time passing, however subjective it may be, is a universal 
aspect of life.  The ability to perceive time accurately is often overlooked, yet deficits in 
time perception play a role in the experience of life for many different clinical 
populations, including patients with unilateral neglect (Danckert et al., 2007), depression 
(Hawkins, French, Crawford, & Enzle, 1988; Sevigny, Everett, & Grondin, 2003), 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; McGee, Brodeur, Symmons, Andrade, & 
Fahie, 2004;  Meaux & Chelonis, 2005; Smith, Taylor, Brammer, Halari, & Rubia, 2008), 
Parkinson’s disease (Rammsayer & Classen, 1997), and senescence (Rueda & 
Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2009).   In addition, decreases in cognitive functioning and 
accurate time duration estimation are negatively correlated, which supports the notion 
that an underlying neurophysiological mechanism for time perception exists and should 
be further examined and explored beyond theoretical concepts (Coelho et al., 2004; 
Rakitin, Stern, & Malapani, 2005).   
 One factor that may influence perception of time is emotion.  Emotion is an 
aspect of life that people experience daily, but is often perceived implicitly as well.  
Previous research supports the idea that healthy emotional experiences and expression 
are important for overall well-being (LeDoux, 1995).  Research also supports the notion 
that many neurophysiological regions and chemicals are involved in the perception and 
expression of emotion.  In fact, it has been proposed that emotion is integrated into 
practically all aspects of cognition (LeDoux, 1995; Megill, 2003). 
 Personality traits may also have a relationship with time perception, though to 
date there is little research within this area.  One such way to study personality traits, as 
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they pertain to time perception, is through the use of the behavioral inhibition system/ 
behavioral activation system (BIS/BAS).  These systems are thought to have distinct 
neural pathways, and are typically examined via self-report scales (Carver & White, 
1994).  The BAS is associated with experiencing positive emotions, like happiness, 
commonly connected with approach behavior.  It is also associated with at least one 
negative emotion, anger, due to its influence on approach motivation tendencies 
(Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2010).  Neurophysiologically, BAS is linked to the 
mesolimbic dopaminergic pathway (Demaree, Robinson, Everhart, & Youngstrom, 
2005).  The BIS, on the other hand, is associated with experiencing negative affect, like 
fear, commonly associated with inhibition.  Neurophysiologically, BIS seems to be 
modulated by adrenergic and serotonergic pathways (Demaree, Robinson, et al., 2005).  
BIS and BAS strength are associated with right- and left-frontal lobe activation, 
respectively (Sutton & Davidson, 1997).  These findings are generally in line with the 
valence hypothesis of emotion, which posits that the brain processes emotion in an 
asymmetric manner according to valence, with the left hemisphere specializing in the 
experience of positive emotionality and the right hemisphere specializing in negative 
emotion (Everhart, Carpenter, Carmona, Ethridge, & Demaree, 2003). Some 
inconsistent baseline asymmetry findings from studies using anger as an emotional 
factor, which is considered to be negative in valence, led to the consideration of the 
approach-withdrawal model of emotion. The approach-withdrawal model posits that the 
left and right frontal lobes are specialized for processing emotions that involve approach 
and withdrawal behaviors, respectively (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998; Harmon-Jones & 
Sigelman, 2001).  
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The purpose of this paper is to review research in the areas of time perception, 
emotion, and the development of the BIS/BAS scales as it relates to relevant clinical 
populations, and to develop the rationale for experimental study of these individual 
differences using an affective temporal Go/NoGo ERP task.
 
 
 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Time Perception Theory 
 Time Perception Theory History. One leading theory of human time perception 
is Scalar Expectancy Theory (also called Scalar Timing Theory), which was first 
developed by Gibbon in 1977, then elaborated on by the same research team (Gibbon, 
Church, Meck, & Warren, 1984) via the use of animal models.  Scalar Expectancy 
Theory has been tested using a variety of methods and paradigms, ranging from animal 
performance on conventional reinforcement schedules (Gibbon, 1977) to the use of 
temporal reproduction tasks in human clinical populations (Malapani et al., 1998).  
 Scalar Expectancy Theory utilizes a temporal information processing model, 
which suggests that a biological internal clock underlies a person’s ability to perceive 
time.  This clock is constantly creating neuronal pulses, which are regulated by what 
theorists call a pacemaker.  Once a person’s attention is on the passage of time, a 
“switch” is flipped on and the number of accumulated pulses is counted until a signal is 
raised when some target interval duration is reached; this number is simultaneously 
held in reference memory.  Subsequent judgments on the passage of time are made by 
comparing the number of pulses being held in working memory with the value stored in 
reference memory (Burle & Casini, 2001; Rueda & Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2009; 
Wearden, 1999).  
 Previous studies pertaining to how each of the aforementioned devices (i.e., the 
internal clock, the working-memory store, the reference memory store, and the 
comparator) work within the model have been completed.  The use of external stimuli or 
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internally-activating factors theoretically isolates and alters a device’s performance on 
time perception tasks. It has been thought that the pacemaker’s rate can be altered by 
factors such as body temperature (O’Hanlon, McGrath, & McCauley, 1974) and 
pharmacological drugs (Meck, 1996), which can be thought of as effects of activation.  
For example, hypothermia can lead to underestimation and hyperthermia can lead to 
overestimation, while all drugs that increase cerebral dopamine level are thought to 
increase pacemaker rate. 
Manipulating arousal also influences the pacemaker rate.  Initially, Treisman 
(1963) speculated that an increase in arousal meant an increase in pacemaker rate. 
Treisman and colleagues (1990) later proposed that the pacemaker frequency is 
adjusted by a calibration unit that accounts for external stimuli at differing frequencies 
affecting the pacemaker rate accordingly (Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, & Brogan, 1990). 
In accordance with this later model, data supported a relationship between increased 
arousal levels and underestimations of time (Treisman et al., 1990).  This finding also 
suggests that the pacemaker output frequency increased (Penton-Voak, Edwards, 
Percival, & Wearden, 1996). 
 Although testing how the pacemaker is accelerated is easily accomplished within 
the laboratory setting, studies that serve to decrease the pacemaker rate have been 
problematic from an ethical standpoint until recently.  Treisman and colleagues (1990) 
commented that a drastic decrease in body temperature decelerated participants’ 
internal clocks.  Naturally, replicating such studies would pose ethical challenges. In 
contrast, testing low arousal states using temporal generalization tasks can be used 
routinely without issue.  
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 A temporal generalization task consists of participants learning a standard 
duration at the start of the experiment with subsequent comparison stimuli of varying 
lengths.  The participant is asked to judge the comparison stimuli as equal to the 
standard by indicating “YES” or “NO.”  It has been shown that the temporal 
generalization gradient is usually peaked close to the standard and slightly 
asymmetrical (Wearden, 1992).  Stimuli that are longer than the standard tend to be 
confused with the standard duration more frequently than shorter stimuli.  In a study that 
included no feedback to participants throughout the temporal generalization task, 
Wearden and colleagues (1999) observed a reduction in participants’ abilities to 
discriminate increasingly longer comparison stimuli from the standard duration, 
suggesting that as arousal was assumed to naturally decrease across the experiment 
due to boredom, so did the clock’s speed (Wearden, Pilkington, & Carter, 1999). 
 This phenomenon was also observed in a series of experiments that included the 
use of a normal temporal generalization task, a verbal estimation task, an episodic 
temporal generalization task, and a temporal bisection task (Wearden, 2008).  These 
experiments were chosen in order to isolate the pacemaker by comparing performance 
of the first two experiments mentioned previously to the last two experiments. 
Performance changed across early and late blocks for the normal temporal 
generalization and verbal estimation tasks, but not for the episodic temporal 
generalization or bisection tasks.  Slow trial pacing lowered arousal levels for all 
participants according to self-ratings of arousal taken before and after the experiments.  
These results indicate that the pacemaker had been slowed down by lowering arousal 
across the experiments’ durations, and that performance changes for the normal 
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temporal generalization and verbal estimation tasks were not due to decline in attention 
or motivation.  Of course, a shortcoming of this study was that researchers relied on 
self-report in order to measure participants’ arousal levels (Wearden, 2008). 
 Other models incorporate the concept of “attention” as an important component 
of time perception.  For example, Zakay and Block (1995) added the concept of a “gate” 
that lies between the pacemaker and the switch that mediates the effects of attention. 
As more attentional resources are allocated to tracking time, the gate opens wider, 
allowing more pulses to pass through to the accumulator (Zakay & Block, 1995).  It has 
also been proposed that attentional disruption during a target interval could either stop 
the accumulation of pulses by opening the switch or by varying the rate of the 
pacemaker (Casini & Macar, 1997).  Time estimation research often involves pairing a 
secondary task, like reading something aloud, while estimating time in order to prevent 
participants from counting explicitly, which has been shown to make time estimation 
much more accurate (Taatgen, van Rijn, & Anderson, 2007).  Other studies have 
included the use of other nontemporal tasks, such as perceptual discrimination, motor 
activities, and spatial processing (Burle & Casini, 2001).  One of the conclusions drawn 
from this line of research was that time estimation is influenced by the amount of 
cognitive demand.  Specifically, more demanding tasks are associated with shorter time 
duration estimations. 
 In order to continue the discussion of attentional processes in time perception, it 
is important to understand the different types of estimation.  There are two types of time 
estimation: prospective and retrospective.  Prospective time estimation involves 
knowing that an estimate of time will have to be made at the start of a given interval, like 
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those examples previously described.  Researchers have referred to prospective time 
estimation as “experienced duration” since people are likely to have encoded temporal 
information as one of the most important parts of their experience of the passage of 
time.  Retrospective time estimation on the other hand is an estimation of time after an 
interval has passed, and is thus commonly referred to as “remembered duration” (Block 
& Zakay, 1997). 
 The model of retrospective and prospective time judgments explained by Zakay 
and Block (1995) is used to show that different processes or systems are employed 
when estimating time durations either retrospectively or prospectively.  This model is 
especially useful for application to everyday events since it mainly focuses on the 
duration of time in seconds and minutes, as opposed to milliseconds.  The experience 
of the passing of time for most can be a very complex process, involving both attention 
and memory resources. 
 Retrospective time estimation occurs when people experience something for 
some amount of time, and then are asked to estimate how much time has elapsed.  In 
regards to internal clock models, this could be described as more implicit in nature 
during the process of experiencing time pass, but more explicit during the actual 
estimation of the amount of elapsed time.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to test because 
once the participant is asked to estimate duration in retrospect, he or she is more likely 
to explicitly try to use prospective estimation for any of the following tasks, potentially 
using different cognitive processes altogether (Zakay &  Block, 1995). 
 A meta-analytic review of 20 experiments comparing prospective and 
retrospective judgments of duration was conducted to investigate the differences 
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between cognitive processes involved in each.  Results indicate that prospective 
judgments are longer than retrospective judgments, and retrospective judgments are 
more variable between participants than are prospective judgments.  In addition, 
prospective judgments are shorter when more attention must be given to stimulus 
information processing, implying that attention plays an important role in prospective 
time estimation.  The finding that retrospective judgments are more variable between 
subjects suggests that people use different processes to remember their experiences of 
time.  It was also found that attention plays little role in retrospective time estimation 
(Block & Zackay, 1997). 
 Findings suggesting that retrospective time estimation utilizes different processes 
than prospective time estimation are in line with Ornstein’s (1970) traditional “storage-
size” model of time perception.  According to this model, subjective duration is 
conceptualized as resulting from nontemporal information processing and originates 
from the quantity and complexity of the information stored in memory. In other words, 
events that take up more “space” in memory are retrospectively remembered as being 
longer than those taking up less space; organization of nontemporal information 
decreases this space.  Thomas and Weaver (1975) described a similar model which 
consisted of a timer that processed temporal information and a stimulus processor that 
focused on nontemporal information.  These two mechanisms were thought to work in 
parallel and also ascribed to the notion that attentional resources were limited.  The 
resource allocation model of Zakay (1989) also included two processors that work in 
tandem but have limited capacity as both are competing for short-term memory 
resources.  The resource allocation model explained that during prospective 
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estimations, temporal information gains precedence for processing as compared to 
nontemporal information; this is different from retrospective estimations, which rely on 
the “size” of the events that take place being held in short-term memory as they are 
converted over into long-term memory. 
 Arousal- Versus Attentional-Based Models. Recently, the attentional gate 
model was compared to the temporal information processing model in terms of utility 
and necessity. Block and Zakay (1996) proposed the attentional gate model, which is a 
combination of Thomas and Weaver’s (1975) previously mentioned model, Treisman’s 
(1963) internal clock model, and the temporal information processing model; the 
attentional gate model also included the novel attentional gate described earlier in order 
to accommodate data from prospective and retrospective timing tasks and for use in 
both human and animal research (Lejeune, 1998).  The attentional gate model adds a 
gate between the pacemaker and the switch at the level of the clock stage of the 
temporal information processing model, which is the main difference between it and the 
temporal information processing model (Lejeune, 1998).  
 Lejeune (1998) argued that the addition of the gate was unnecessary and 
redundant because the switch used in the temporal information processing model could 
account for attentional effects observed in human and animal research, especially if one 
considers the switch to be a “flickering” switch, or if one takes into account the 
asymmetrical temporal generalization gradient described earlier.  Zakay (2000) 
countered this conclusion, pointing out the importance of keeping temporal attentional 
and perceptual-information processes independent of one another within models of 
prospective time perception, in particular, which a flickering switch model does not do.  
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It was also argued that the attentional gate model could account for complex temporal 
patterns with the separation of the gate and switch, while a flickering switch model could 
only operate in an “all-or-none” fashion (Zakay, 2000).  In response to Zakay’s remarks, 
Lejeune agreed about the independent nature of attention, but also that this was never 
the issue, nor was it ever stated that the flickering switch incorporated both kinds of 
information in one unit.  Instead, it was argued that the continuity and irregular 
distribution of attentional processes over time could fit within a flickering switch model 
(e.g., proportional effects on data versus absolute effects on data for attentional 
models), and that since attentional processes can influence the switch from outside of 
the conceptual model, the temporal information processing model should be favored 
(Lejeune, 2000).  
 Burle and Casini (2001) followed up on the issues raised by Zakay (2000) and 
Lejeune (2000) with regard to the mechanism that accounts for attention in time 
perception.  Using a combination of a time production task with a reaction time task, 
three models of time perception with both activation and attention variables were 
investigated.  They proposed that attention and activation would affect different internal 
clock mechanisms, specifically the switch and the pacemaker, respectively. The first two 
models were the attentional gate and the temporal information processing models, while 
the other model asserted that both attention and activation would affect the pacemaker.  
Participants were asked to undergo three trials of experiments, starting with a time 
production task while listening to clicks at varying levels of intensity, followed by a 
reaction time task, and ending with performing both tasks simultaneously. Participants 
produced longer durations in the combined task condition than in the time production 
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task only condition, indicating that fewer attentional resources resulted in 
underestimations of time during the combined task.  Furthermore, participants produced 
shorter durations when click intensity was strong than when it was weak, indicating that 
activation level increases resulted in overestimations of time durations.  Overall, results 
indicated that attention and activation were indeed independent of one another, and 
more specifically that activation level affects the pacemaker rate while attention level 
affects an “all-or-none” functioning switch.  These findings lend support to the temporal 
information processing model (Burle & Casini, 2001).   
Time Perception and Emotion 
 Regardless of model choice, it is clear that time perception is affected by both 
arousal and attention.  Importantly, emotion has been shown to influence both of these 
variables (Ohman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977).  From an 
arousal perspective, emotional stimuli should lead to overestimations in time perception 
via a sped up pacemaker rate.  Attentional models suggest, on the other hand, that 
emotional stimuli should distract from temporal information processing, thereby reducing 
the amount of temporal pulses emitted, resulting in underestimations in time perception. 
Both of these models have been considered in time perception research using 
emotional stimuli, and interesting results have been observed. 
 Past research has clearly indicated that perceived durations of emotionally 
arousing events are usually distorted according to valence compared to neutral events 
(Angrilli, Cherubini, Pavese, & Manfredini, 1997; Droit-Volet, Brunot, & Niedenthal, 
2004; Effron, Niedenthal, Gil, & Droit-Volet, 2006; Gil, Niedenthal, & Droit-Volet, 2007; 
Noulhiane, Mella, Samson, Ragot, & Pouthas, 2007; Thayer & Schiff, 1975; Watts & 
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Sharrock, 1984).  Generally, with some exceptions according to experimental design, as 
arousal increases with the presentation of emotional stimuli, time estimations also 
increase.  Negative valence, but not positive valence, is also generally correlated with 
overestimations. 
 The influence of emotional state on the perception of time has been studied 
among different normal populations.  Notably, evidence of a double mechanism 
comprised of an approach-withdrawal attentional element and an appetitive-aversive 
emotional element has been supported, and its interaction with two primary components 
of emotion (affective valence and level of arousal) seems to play a role in evaluation of 
perceived time (Angrilli et al., 1997).  For example, people tended to overestimate 
negative compared to positive emotional stimuli if the stimuli were highly arousing, while 
people tended to judge negative emotional low-arousal stimuli as shorter compared to 
positive low-arousal emotional stimuli during verbal estimation and temporal 
reproduction tasks.  However, no overestimations were observed compared to real time, 
which Angrilli and colleagues (1997) explained as a function of the complexity of the 
task used.  Angrilli and colleagues further stated that the suprasecond lengths of the 
stimuli may not have been sensitive enough to detect an arousal effect. 
 In another study testing the effects of emotion on time estimation, evidence 
supporting an arousal effect was observed during a temporal bisection task using 
affective facial stimuli between 400ms and 1600ms (Droit-Volet et al., 2004).  An effect 
of arousal appeared most prominent in that the proportion of “long” responses was 
higher than “short” responses, and a bias towards long responses was observed.  Also 
of interest was that overestimations varied by stimulus affect.  More specifically, faces 
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portraying anger, considered to be a high arousal emotion, were more overestimated 
than faces portraying sadness, considered to be a low arousal emotion.  In fact, as 
durations of angry facial stimuli increased, participants’ overestimations increased as 
well so much that overestimation was more prominent at longer durations.  In terms of 
internal clock models, emotional stimuli presented at these lengths may be influencing 
time estimation in a way that results in overestimation via affecting pacemaker speed.  
 A subsequent study testing the effect of arousal on time perception was 
conducted using affective facial stimuli, as well, but the role of embodiment was used to 
explain arousal’s effects (Effron et al., 2006).  The term “embodiment” refers in this case 
to imitation of facial expressions as a means of cognitive introspection and perception of 
emotion in others.  It is thought that imitation of emotion of others plays a role in arousal 
in that enhancement of imitation leads to overestimation.  In order to test the role of 
embodiment on emotion and time perception, a temporal bisection task much like Droit-
Volet and colleagues’ (2004) previously described study was used.  In one condition, 
participants performed such a task while holding a pen in their mouths while in the other 
condition participants were free to imitate the facial stimuli that were presented.  In line 
with their hypothesis, participants overestimated emotional stimuli compared to neutral 
faces only during the free-to-imitate condition (Effron et al., 2006).  These results lend 
support to arousal models of time perception in that replication of Droit-Volet and 
colleagues’ (2004) findings was observed. 
 In order to assess age-related variations in time perception at an early age, one 
study was conducted testing 3-, 5-, and 8-year olds using a modified temporal bisection 
task with angry and neutral stimuli (Gil et al., 2007).  It was found that children as young 
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as 3 years of age were able to estimate time, with sensitivity of this skill increasing with 
age.  It was also found that children of all ages in the study judged the angry facial 
stimuli to be longer than the neutral stimuli durations, again supporting an arousal effect 
for stimuli of short lengths. 
 These findings were extended from the visual modality to the auditory modality 
using affective auditory stimuli in short durations ranging from 2 seconds to 6 seconds 
in timing reproduction and verbal estimation tasks (Noulhiane et al., 2007).  A neutral 
condition and a self-assessment of valence and arousal were included in order to allow 
for a better understanding of the effect emotion has on time perception.  For the 
reproduction task, emotional sounds were perceived as being longer than neutral 
sounds for shorter durations.  Furthermore, negative sounds were perceived as longer 
and more variable than positive sounds for shorter durations.  These results are 
consistent with results from previously explained studies (Droit-Volet et al., 2004; Gil et 
al., 2007) and support arousal-based models of time perception.  During the 
reproduction task, another interesting finding emerged for the shorter 2-second 
standard duration condition that was inconsistent with the arousal model. High-arousing 
stimuli reproduction was shorter than reproduction of low-arousing stimuli.  This finding 
can be explained using attentional models wherein attention should be shared between 
timing and emotion processing for reproduction tasks, leading to a loss of pulses 
accumulated.  This would result in shorter reproductions for high-arousing stimuli.  
Similar findings were observed for the verbal estimation task, further corroborating both 
attentional and arousal modulations of timing emotional events. However, findings from 
longer durations were inconsistent with past research on arousal.  Participants rated 
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sounds equally according to valence and arousal no matter what the valence, even 
though as durations increased, so should have arousal ratings (Noulhiane et al., 2007).  
This was explained as a confounding effect of arousal with an attentional effect, which 
could be indicative of the effects of a “flickering” switch.  Results from this study also 
included main effects of both valence and arousal on duration judgment, whereas past 
research only produced an interaction between them (Angrilli et al., 1997).  This may be 
explained as a difference resulting from modality choices in tasks, but it remains unclear 
as to what role modality plays in the context of emotional time perception. 
Time Perception and Personality Traits 
 Using Eysenck’s earlier work on personality (1970), Hogan proposed that 
variables of personality, specifically extraversion and introversion, could potentially 
connect the opposing views of temporal perception researchers, among them being 
Ornstein (1970) with his “storage-size” model described earlier, and Priestly (1968) with 
an early form of an attention model (Hogan, 1978).  Hogan postulated that since, 
according to Eysenck (1970), extraverts and introverts respond very differently to their 
physical and social environments, respective perceptions should differ as well.  More 
specifically, extraverts would typically experience a standard amount of stimulation (or 
level of arousal in terms of current models) as lower compared to the average person, 
while the opposite would be true of introverts.  According to Eysenck’s inhibition theory 
of extraversion, extraverts have a different reactive inhibition than introverts in that it 
generates more quickly and dissipates more slowly.  Several studies supported the 
notion that extraverts would overestimate duration compared to introverts (Claridge, 
1960; Lynn, 1961).  Thus, Hogan included extraversion (a “perception style,” per se) 
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and stimulus complexity as dimensional elements in a model of time perception that 
connected Ornstein’s and Priestly’s models into a U-function relationship accordingly. 
 A study testing Hogan’s model was performed using a retrospective time 
comparative design in which participants were asked to observe a standard slide for 30 
seconds, and then asked to observe another slide with more or less complexity 
(Lomranz, 1983).  Participants were then asked to compare on a scale of 1 (much less 
time) to 5 (much more time) the duration of the second slide’s presentation to the first 
slide’s presentation.  The participants were then asked to complete an inventory 
assessing extraversion.  Hogan’s model was supported in that results from this study 
indicated a U-function relationship between stimulus complexity and duration. More 
specifically, as complexity increased, duration was perceived as shorter up to a certain 
level, at which point the opposite was seen in duration perception.  The relationship was 
stronger in extraverts than in introverts, which could point to Eysenck’s claim and 
Hogan’s agreement that extraverts have a higher arousal baseline than introverts, such 
that time perception is not affected in an extravert unless stimulus complexity is extreme 
(high or low).  
 More recent research has supported the notion that personality traits affect 
perception of time.  Several studies have shown that extraverts overestimate time 
relative to introverts (Davidson & House, 1982; Rammsayer, 1997; Zakay, Lomranz, & 
Kaziniz, 1984); these results were found for low or medium stimulus complexity only, 
however.  On the other hand, several studies have results that show the opposite effect 
of extraversion on time perception, in that higher extraversion scores were related to 
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underestimation (Buchwald & Blatt, 1974; Wudel, 1979), and other studies find no effect 
of extraversion on time estimation (Gray, Gray, & Loehlin, 1975; Kirkcaldy, 1984).  
 Others have offered various theories concerning personality traits and the 
resultant effects on behavior.  According to Gray (1990), cognition and emotion are two 
distinct variables to be thought of within models, but he argues that perhaps this 
distinction should not be made.  Instead, these two variables should be thought of as a 
function of reinforcement behaviors that help people adapt and shape personality.  
Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity theory is comprised of three fundamental emotion 
systems: the Behavioral Activation System, the Fight-Flight-or-Freeze System, and the 
Behavioral Inhibition System.  Each system is associated with neural activity and 
neurotransmitters, including dopamine, which is of particular interest in time perception 
research as it plays an important role in motor movement timing.  
Dopamine is also associated with feelings of pleasure and is used by the brain to 
reinforce behaviors associated with seeking out certain pleasurable experiences.  
Dopamine is thought to play a central role in the motivation system called BAS, which is 
sensitive to indications of reward, nonpunishment, and escape from punishment, 
causing a person to engage in goal-oriented behavior (Carver & White, 1994).  
According to Gray’s Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory, BAS is also thought to be 
responsible for the experience of positive emotions (Balconi , Falbo, & Brambilla, 2009; 
Carver & White, 1994).  In an electrophysiological study using positive, negative, and 
neutral emotional stimuli, people who rated high on the BAS scale had a significant and 
more intense response to positive emotional stimuli than to negative or neutral stimuli 
(Balconi et al., 2009).  It has been found that people who have high BAS scores have 
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increased left-frontal activation (Coan & Allen, 2003), especially when presented with 
positive emotional stimuli (Balconi et al., 2009).  These findings are in line with Gray’s 
theory.  Gray’s theory is also supported on the molecular genetics level as high 
dopamine activity indicated through the investigation of COMTxDRD2 epistasis was 
associated with high BAS scores (Reuter, Schmitz, Corr, & Hennig, 2006). 
Another component of Gray’s theory is the BIS, which is associated with anxiety, 
and is sensitive to signals of punishment, nonreward, and novelty (Carver & White, 
1994).  It has been found that people who score high on BIS have greater right-frontal 
activation in EEG studies (Balconi et al., 2009; Demaree, Robinson, et al., 2005; 
Demaree, Everhart, Youngstrom, & Harrison, 2005).  People who score high on BIS are 
thought to experience more negative affect than those people who score low on BIS. 
In relation to time perception, little research has been completed with regards to 
personality traits, specifically according to Gray’s theory.  However, negative affect is 
correlated with BIS. In one study, individual differences in negative emotionality were 
found to influence time perception during the experience of negative emotion.  The 
presentation of angry and fearful facial stimuli was correlated with increased levels of 
overestimation (Tipples, 2008).  This finding supported arousal-based models of time 
perception.  One explanation offered as to why an attentional effect was not observed 
(i.e., one that would have resulted in underestimations of angry and fearful stimuli) is 
that the attentional effects were mediated by emotional arousal through noradrenaline 
increase thought to originate in the locus coeruleus, which affects the operation of both 
attentional and time processes, and is also thought to facilitate orienting and slower 
disengagement of attention (Tipples, 2008). Of particular interest was the finding that 
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angry faces led to greater overestimations of time durations than both fearful and happy 
expressions (Tipples, 2008).  This was unexpected since fearful faces are usually 
judged as appearing more aroused than angry faces, meaning that fearful facial stimuli 
should have led to similar overestimations as angry faces.  This finding may be 
indicative of the presence of an anger-specific response system, and may be linked to 
Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity theory. 
Time Perception and Clinical Populations 
Another reason prospective time estimation studies have been employed is 
because they can provide great insight into the cognitive processes involved in many 
clinical populations that have difficulties in executive functioning due to 
neurophysiological or neurochemical abnormalities.  Prospective time perception tasks 
have been utilized to observe deficits in cognitive functioning among people with 
unilateral neglect, ADHD, aging, mood disorders like depression, and motor movement 
disorders like Parkinson’s disease.   
 In a study of unilateral neglect patients, it was found that people with unilateral 
right-hemisphere neglect have a difficult time estimating multisecond durations of time 
as they significantly underestimated all durations tested against controls (Danckert et 
al., 2007).  This study also pointed to the importance of the fronto-parietal network of 
the right hemisphere in the perception of time.   
 Another study involving ADHD adolescents produced results that stressed the 
importance of similar brain regions and neural networks in time estimation, specifically 
noting the right lateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate gyrus and how 
abnormalities in this region in adolescents with ADHD were associated with decreased 
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activation in these areas compared to controls (Smith et al., 2008).  Results from 
another study involving children suffering with ADHD along with children with a reading 
disorder indicated that children with ADHD overestimated the time taken to fill out 
Conners’ Continuous Performance Test compared to children with a reading disorder, 
but both groups performed comparably on an explicit time estimation task, stressing the 
importance of both affective state and attention in time perception (McGee et al., 2004).  
Findings from a study involving boys and girls with ADHD suggested that behavioral 
inhibition is an important component of time perception, in that less behavioral inhibition 
was associated with poor time perception (Meaux & Chelonis, 2005).  As inhibition has 
much to do with the dopaminergic-reward system, findings from a study involving adults 
with ADHD indicated that this population contracts interval durations, suggesting the 
significance of impaired dopamine dynamics in the ADHD population (Gilden & 
Marusich, 2009). 
 Aging is associated with less accurate time perception as a function of frontal 
lobe changes associated with healthy aging (Gunstad, Cohen, Paul, Luyster, & Gordon, 
2006).  Another study comparing young adults, older adults, and patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease confirmed the notion that variability in time perception increases 
with age, and also found that variability increases even more dramatically with the onset 
of Alzheimer’s disease (Rueda & Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2009). 
 Mood disorders, specifically depression, have been found to affect many 
cognitive functions, including the perception of time.  One study comparing depressed 
and nondepressed participants on the Continuous Performance Test demonstrated that 
depressed patients had a difficult time discriminating between relatively long durations 
22 
 
compared to nondepressed participants (Sevigny et al., 2003).  Findings from another 
study involving depressed patients revealed that depression seems to elongate the 
experience of time passing; however, chronometric time judgments were not affected 
with time duration estimations in minutes (Hawkins et al., 1988).   
 Another clinical population that has been shown to have problems with time 
estimation is the Parkinson’s disease population.  The Parkinson’s disease population is 
of particular interest in time perception research because it has long been thought to be 
a disorder of the basal ganglia, associated with the degeneration of neurons in the pars 
compacta in the substantia nigra, which is part of the previously mentioned 
dopaminergic-reward pathway (Rammsayer & Classen, 1997).  The subsequent 
depletion of dopamine in the dorsal striatum affects movement abilities, resulting in the 
classic motor movement symptoms of Parkinson’s disease of tremor, rigidity, 
bradykinesia, and postural instability.  This is of particular interest for time perception 
research because it has been suggested that the same timing mechanism involved in 
duration estimation and information processing is used in timing behavior, including 
motor movements (Treisman, Faulkner, & Naish, 1992). 
To investigate this relationship, one study tested 20 patients with Parkinson’s 
disease against matched controls in a temporal discrimination task of durations in 
milliseconds.  The Parkinson’s disease group performed significantly poorer than the 
control group, in that the Parkinson’s disease group could discriminate durations from 
one another as long as they were around at least 90 milliseconds different from each 
other, compared to the control group having a threshold around 20 milliseconds 
(Rammsayer & Classen, 1997).  While results indicated that Parkinson’s disease 
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patients have a difficult time discriminating durations of short time intervals from each 
other compared to controls, results correlating the severity of motor movement 
symptoms of the Parkinson’s disease group revealed nonsignificant findings.  This is 
contrary to the notion that the same timing mechanism is shared by both duration 
estimation and motor movement timing. 
Another time estimation study of short auditory durations in Parkinson’s disease 
patients and age- and IQ-matched controls involving the use of a click manipulation had 
findings that seemed to contradict this relationship, as the Parkinson’s disease group 
had results that were comparable to the control group (Wearden et al., 2009).  As both 
of the previously-mentioned studies involved participants in the Parkinson’s disease 
group who were currently taking dopaminergic medication, it is important to consider the 
effects of this factor on the possibility of there being a relationship between motor 
movement symptomatology and time estimation performance.  The Wearden and 
colleagues (2009) study included participants in the Parkinson’s disease group in both 
“on” and “off” states in regards to taking medication, and results indicated no significant 
difference in performance across conditions.  Rammsayer and Classen (1997) suggest 
that performance on temporal perception with regards to medicated patients with 
Parkinson’s disease should be thought more of as a trait marker for dopamine 
decreases in the basal ganglia as opposed to an acute indicator of clinical 
symptomatology. 
Another study testing the effect of Parkinson’s disease on temporal perception 
across different modalities and durations was conducted (Smith, Harper, Gittings, & 
Abernethy, 2007).  Patients with Parkinson’s disease participated in a duration-bisection 
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task across both auditory and visual modalities and across both sub- and supra-second 
intervals.  Results indicated impairment in temporal perception in the longer duration for 
the Parkinson’s disease group.  Researchers from this study suggest that the bisection 
procedure utilized in this study may be useful to test further the role of the basal ganglia 
in temporal perception. 
Electrophysiology, Time Perception, and Inhibition 
 One way to gain insight into any cognitive or emotional (if indeed you can 
separate the two) event that occurs at the subsecond level is to examine event-related 
potentials, or ERPs.  ERPs are voltage changes that occur as a result of the brain’s 
response to a presented stimulus, and are thought to represent post-synaptic changes 
in neurons (Coles & Rugg, 1995).  ERPs are recorded from a participant via electrodes 
evenly distributed across the scalp while the participant engages in an experimental 
task.  Positive and negative deflections of voltage (e.g., N1, P1, N2, P2, etc.) are of 
particular interest in cognitive neuroscience research, as are the latencies in 
milliseconds and amplitudes in microvolts of these deflections.  Recent research in time 
perception has used EEG to investigate neural correlates of temporal events. 
 One such study incorporated a temporal generalization task at the subsecond 
level using emotional and neutral facial stimuli (Gan, Wang, Zhang, Li, & Luo, 2009). 
Under the emotional conditions, the P160 and P280 amplitudes were enhanced and the 
N230 amplitude was decreased, suggesting that emotion modulated temporal 
processing even at the subsecond level.  A surprising finding from this study was that 
the smallest N2 amplitudes, thought to be indicative of inhibition, were recorded for 
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angry facial stimuli.  This task was an implicit emotional task, however, and so an 
attentional bias in processing could account for these findings. 
 Chen and Yeh (2009) were interested in the effects of adding a sound or visual 
object to the judgment of visual or auditory duration, respectively.  They used an oddball 
paradigm to do this, which consisted of the presentation of a series of standards and 
“oddballs” to participants according to modality.  For example, one experiment in this 
study consisted of standards that were auditory sounds while the oddballs were visual 
objects.  Participants were asked to compare the presented duration of an oddball to the 
duration of the standards.  Results indicated asymmetric cross-modal effects, more 
specifically that sound seemed to extend a perceived visual duration while visual object 
presentation had no effect on auditory time estimation (Chen & Yeh, 2009). 
 An aspect of executive function that is important in timing in conversations and 
withholding inappropriate responses is inhibition.  Inhibition has been studied 
electrophysiologically using a Go/Nogo ERP task.  In this type of task, participants are 
presented with target and nontarget stimuli and are asked to refrain from responding 
after the presentation of nontarget stimuli.  Two ERP components are usually of interest 
in this kind of study, namely the N2 and P3 (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Hohnsbein, 2002; 
Beste, Dziobek, Hielscher, Willemssen, & Falkenstien, 2009). 
 The N2 is a frontal negative displacement that usually occurs between 200ms 
and 300ms after stimulus presentation.  The P3 is a fronto-central positive displacement 
that usually occurs between 300ms and 500ms after stimulus presentation.  The N2 
component is thought to reflect inhibition on a premotor level (Falkenstein, Hoorman, & 
Hohnsbein, 1999), while the P3 component is thought to reflect motor inhibition, or the 
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evaluation of inhibitory processes (Beste et al., 2008; Burle et al., 2004).  A right 
preponderance of activity has been recorded on occasion for both the N2 and P3 
(Falkenstein et al., 2002).  Orbitofrontal and inferior anterior cingulate cortices (ACC) 
are thought to mediate the generation of these ERP components (Beste et al., 2009; 
Yu, Yuan, & Luo, 2009). 
 Yu and colleagues (2009) used an auditory Go/Nogo ERP task in order to 
investigate the effects of auditory emotion on response inhibition.  Results indicated that 
response times were longer for “go” stimuli for negative compared to positive and 
neutral conditions.  Interestingly, the “nogo” N2 was larger for neutral conditions than for 
the emotion conditions.  This suggests that emotional sounds have a modulatory effect 
on behavioral inhibitory performance (Yu et al., 2009). 
Hypotheses 
 There has been much research in the areas of time perception, emotion, and 
personality.  To date, however, the relationships among these variables and the neural 
correlates have not been systematically examined.  The present study utilized a 
Go/Nogo time perception task using emotional stimuli to test the effect of emotional 
valence on time perception.  Self-reported personality characteristics using the BIS/BAS 
scales and inhibitory neural correlates derived from ERPs were also examined.  The 
purpose of the present study was to: 
(1) Examine the relationship among levels of BIS/BAS, affect, and perceived 
stimulus duration using behavioral and self report measures. Since visual emotional 
stimuli elicit higher arousal levels, it was hypothesized that participants would 
overestimate durations of emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli.  More 
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specifically, higher self-reported BAS scores would be associated with the tendency to 
overestimate the amount of time that positive stimuli were presented since previous 
findings indicated higher BAS scorers had more intense responses to positive stimuli 
(Balconi et al., 2009).  Furthermore, self-reported BIS scores would be associated with 
the tendency to overestimate the amount of time that negative stimuli were presented. 
(2) Use the Go/Nogo paradigm to compare the effects that BIS/BAS, stimulus 
duration and stimulus valence have on the inhibitory N2 component.  It was 
hypothesized that N2 amplitudes during Nogo stimuli would be larger than those 
observed during Go stimuli.  The N2 component was also expected to be different for 
participants who scored higher on BAS compared to participants who scored higher on 
BIS.  With regard to stimulus valence, higher scores on BAS would be associated with 
larger N2 amplitudes for positive Nogo stimuli, while higher scores on BIS would be 
associated with larger N2 amplitudes for negative Nogo stimuli.  
(3) Replicate findings from past research regarding resting asymmetry and the 
BIS/BAS measures.  It was hypothesized that high scores on BIS would be associated 
with right frontal activity while high scores on BAS would be associated with left frontal 
activity. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III: METHOD 
Participants 
Based on a priori power analysis to detect large effects with 80% power using 
GPower 3.1, forty-five right-handed volunteers aged 18 years and older (M = 19.78, SD 
= 4.1) from East Carolina University were recruited using the undergraduate psychology 
participant pool.  Of these participants, 32 were women and 13 were men. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no prior significant 
neurological or psychiatric history. 
Materials 
Participants completed several self-report measures before the experimental 
procedure.  Carver and White’s (1994) BIS/BAS scales were completed by the 
participants as a way to measure behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation of each 
participant, and the Lateral Preference Inventory was administered to assess for 
handedness and other features of lateral preference (i.e., eye, ear, leg) (Coren, Proac, 
& Duncan, 1979).  Other self-report measures that were administered include the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, the Mini IPIP Scales, and the Sensation-Seeking Scale. 
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale is a reliable measure of impulsivity with three 
factors (nonplanning, motor impulsivity, and attention impulsivity) in both normal and 
clinical populations (Spinella, 2007).  The Mini-IPIP is a short form of the 50-item 
International Personality Item Pool- Five-Factor Model measure that is used to survey 
the Big Five personality traits; it has demonstrated consistent convergent, discriminant, 
and criterion-related validity (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006).  The Sensation 
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Seeking Scale has demonstrated satisfactory internal reliability when total scores are 
considered, but when the subscales (Thrill and Adventure-Seeking, Experience 
Seeking, Disinhibition and Boredom Susceptibility) are considered separately, some 
concern is raised with regards to each of their reliabilities, especially considering its use 
of dated language and examples of sensation-seeking activities (Gilchrist, Povey, 
Dickinson, & Povey, 1995). 
Equipment and Stimuli 
The control and presentation of the experimental stimuli and recording of 
participants responses were managed with SCAN 4.4 software (Compumedics 
Neuroscan, El Paso, TX).  The stimuli that were presented to represent duration 
conditions consisted of three types of pictures (positive, negative, or neutral) selected 
from the IAPS, which were matched for valence and arousal (Bradley & Lang, 2007).  
All items were matched for luminance and size.  Event related potentials were recorded 
during stimuli presentation throughout the duration of the task. 
Affective Go/NoGo Task 
Participants performed a temporal Go/Nogo task using emotional stimuli, 
adapted from two primary studies (Falkenstein et al., 2002; Gan et al., 2009).  It was 
comprised of a learning phase, a practice phase, and a testing phase.  During the 
learning phase, participants were shown the “standard” stimulus duration (700 ms) 10 
times, represented by a gray oval on the screen that was the same size as the actual 
stimuli (Figure 1). 
30 
 
During the practice phase, participants learned the Go/Nogo paradigm using 
neutral stimuli for both target and nontarget stimuli.  The target stimuli were neutral 
IAPS pictures while the nontarget stimulus was the gray oval used during the learning  
  
Figure 1. Learning phase: “Standard” stimulus (700ms) was presented 10 times in 
succession represented by a shape. 
 
phase.  In its entirety, the practice phase consisted of one trial block with 150 
presentations of target stimuli (30 presentations of each duration condition) and 50 
presentations of nontarget stimuli; however, participants were only exposed to 7 
minutes of the practice phase in order to allow enough time for them to gain mastery of 
the task without becoming bored or lethargic.  Stimuli were presented in five stimulus 
durations (280ms, 490ms, 700ms, 910ms, and 1120ms).  The occurrence of target and 
nontarget stimuli was pseudo-random, and the interstimulus interval was 1600ms.  The 
participants compared the duration of the target stimulus presentation to the “standard” 
duration.  The participants then responded using a mouse according to the comparison 
made.  If the participants made the judgment that the target stimulus duration was 
longer than the “standard” duration, the participants were instructed to press the right 
mouse button using the third finger of the right hand.  If the target stimulus was 
perceived as being shorter than the “standard” duration, the participant was instructed 
to press the left mouse button using the index finger of the right hand.  Even though 
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some target stimuli were equal in duration to the “standard” stimulus duration, 
participants were forced to choose between only two responses (longer than or shorter 
than the “standard”).  This allowed for testing the effect that personality traits and/or 
emotion had on time estimation (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Practice phase 
 
a)  
 
 
 
 
b)  
 
 
(a) If the participant is presented with the target stimulus (in the example above, the 
target stimulus is a neutral IAPS picture), the participant will judge if the stimulus 
is shorter or longer than the standard duration. In the example above, the 
participant should press the right button on the mouse to indicate that the 
duration was longer than the standard stimulus duration. 
(b) If the participant is presented with the nontarget stimulus (the gray oval used in 
the learning phase), the participant will inhibit any response and wait for the next 
stimulus presentation.   
  
Press right 
mouse button 
910ms 
Neutral 
IAPS 
Picture 
Please 
Respond 
Inhibit 
Response 
Please 
Respond 
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During the testing phase, participants encountered two trials of the previously 
described Go/Nogo task, in which target stimuli were based on valence (positive or 
negative).  During one trial block, positive IAPS pictures served as target stimuli with 
negative IAPS pictures acting as the nontarget stimuli.  During this trial block, 
participants chose if a positive stimulus was shorter than or longer than the “standard” 
duration, and inhibited any response to negative stimuli (Figure 3a).  During the other 
trial block, negative IAPS pictures were the target stimuli while positive IAPS pictures 
were nontarget stimuli.  Participants chose if a negative stimulus was shorter than or 
longer than the “standard” duration during this trial block, and inhibited any response to 
positive stimuli presentation (Figure 3b).  The order of the positive and negative target 
sessions was counterbalanced across participants.  The target stimuli were presented 
150 times while nontarget stimuli were presented 50 times.  The occurrence of target 
and nontarget stimuli within each block was pseudo-random, and the interstimulus 
interval was 1600ms.  Each block contained 200 trials.  The duration conditions were 
the same as those explained in the practice phase, and participants only had two 
possible response choices for target stimuli (longer than or shorter than the “standard”).  
Participants were encouraged to respond as quickly as possible to target stimuli through 
written and verbal instructions prior to task completion.  Participants were presented 
with the “standard” duration five times between blocks. 
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Figure 3. Test phase. 
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
 
a) During the Positive Target Trial Block, if the participant is presented with a target 
stimulus (positive IAPS picture), the participant will compare its duration to the 
“standard” duration.  The participant will then respond using the mouse as was learned 
during the practice phase.  In the example above, the participant should judge the 
duration to be longer than the “standard,” and thus press the right button on the mouse.  
When presented with a negative (nontarget) stimulus, the participant should inhibit a 
response. 
b) During the Negative Target Trial Block, if the participant is presented with a target 
stimulus (negative IAPS picture), the participant will compare its duration to the 
“standard” duration, and then respond using the mouse.  In the example above, the 
participant is presented with a “shorter” stimulus, and thus should respond by pressing 
the left button on the mouse.  When presented with a positive (nontarget) stimulus, the 
participant should inhibit a response. 
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Procedures 
 Participants were tested in the Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory located within 
the Department of Psychology at East Carolina University.  Prior to participation, 
informed consent forms that were approved by the University Policy and Review 
Committee on Human Research of East Carolina University were reviewed orally with 
each participant and signed by each participant.  Adherence to the “Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct” was kept with all participants in this study 
(American Psychological Association, 2002).  Once consent was established, 
participants completed self-report inventories and were acclimated to EEG recording 
procedures and given written instructions for the Affective Go/NoGo Task.  
Procedures for electroencephalogram (EEG) analysis were adapted from 
Everhart and Demaree (2003).  Participants were seated in an electrically shielded 
room in a comfortable reclining chair and fitted with a lycra electrode cap (Electro-Cap 
International, Inc.).  Electrodes were arranged according to the 10-20 international 
system (Jasper, 1958).  EEG data were recorded from 32 active electrode sites using 
linked ears (A1 and A2) as a reference (monopolar montage).  Electrode placement 
included Frontal: F3, F4, F7, F8; Central: Cz, C3, C4; Temporal: T3, T4, T5, T6; 
Parietal: Pz, P3, P4; and Occipital: O1, O2. In addition, electrodes were placed on the 
outer cantus of each eye so that eye movement recordings could be obtained.  
Electrode impedance was maintained below 5000 holms and checked at the beginning 
and end of the experimental session. Eye movement recordings were used to correct 
for the presence of eye movement artifact in the ERPs and to determine which trials 
should be excluded from averaging. Individual trials that contained excessive artifact 
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associated with body and eye movement were excluded during off-line processing and 
prior to averaging. The EEG and eye movements were recorded with a bandpass of 1 
and 100 Hz and a sensitivity of 7.5 µV/mm for EEG recordings.  The EEG signal was 
amplified and converted on line to digital using a NeuroScan 32-channel PC based 
EEG/Evoked potential brain mapping system.  A high-pass filter was used to eliminate 
slow wave frequencies that were less than 2 Hz.  A 60 Hz notch filter was used to 
eliminate 60 Hz line noise. Artifact reduction was completed prior to computing grand 
averages for EEG and N2 data.  Data were stored and analyzed on a PC Pentium 
Computer.  The EEG data were converted on line for display, storage, and analysis 
(Everhart & Demaree, 2003). 
 Once participants finished reading through the instructions for completing all 
experimental procedures, baseline EEG was recorded according to procedures adapted 
from Davidson (1988), including four minutes of baseline recording alternating between 
eyes open and eyes closed conditions.  Participants then participated in the learning, 
practice, and test phases of the affective Go/NoGo task. Before each trial of the test 
phase, participants engaged in the learning phase. Error rate was measured as a 
behavioral variable to assess a bias in time perception during the “Go” standard 
duration stimuli presentations.  After completion of all trials, the N2 responses were 
identified by visual inspection as the most negative peak between 100ms and 300ms 
(Falkenstein et al., 2002). Difference waves between Go and NoGo stimuli of equal 
duration for each valence were computed to form the N2d component (Nogo-Go).  
Separate grand averages for all data were created. Event related potentials were 
averaged across participants for emotional valence and stimulus duration.  
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Analyses  
Hypothesis One. Correlational analyses were performed to determine the 
relationship between BIS, BAS, and an overestimation bias score when presented with 
target stimuli that were equivalent to the “standard” duration.  The overestimation bias 
score was computed as the proportion of “longer” responses to the overall number of 
responses made during each test phase trial. The distribution of these scores was 
roughly normal. These analyses were used to investigate the hypothesis that higher 
self-reported BIS scores would be associated with the tendency to overestimate the 
amount of time that negative stimuli were presented.  These analyses were also used to 
investigate the hypothesis that higher self-reported BAS scores would be associated 
with the tendency to overestimate the amount of time that positive stimuli were 
presented.   
 Hypothesis Two. Paired samples t-test was used to investigate the hypothesis 
that N2 amplitudes for “NoGo” stimuli would be larger than N2 amplitudes for “Go” 
stimuli.  ANCOVA with BIS/BAS as covariates and the dependent variable of N2d 
amplitude (NoGo-Go N2 amplitude for emotion and duration condition) was also 
conducted.  Duration (short and long) and valence (positive and negative) were included 
as factors.  These analyses were used to investigate the hypothesis that higher BAS 
scores are associated with greater N2 amplitudes for positive Nogo stimuli.  These 
analyses were also used to investigate the hypothesis that higher BIS scores are 
associated with greater N2 amplitudes for negative Nogo stimuli. 
 Hypothesis Three. In order to investigate the hypothesis that high scores on BIS 
are associated with right frontal activity while high scores on BAS are associated with 
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left frontal activity, an asymmetry score (R-L) for alpha power (8-12 Hz) was calculated.  
Correlational analyses for BIS and BAS scores with the asymmetry score were then 
conducted. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
 Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS 19 statistical software package 
(IBM, Inc., Armonk, NY).  Raw data were initially inspected for missing data and 
normality. Behavioral data from seven participants were incomplete due to 
noncompliance with the task, and were left out of correlational analyses for hypothesis 
one.  Due to substantial electrooculography (EOG) and electromyography (EMG) 
artifact during ERP recordings, nineteen participants were excluded from ANCOVA for 
hypothesis two.  EOG and EMG were related to researchers’ observations of 
participants shifting in their seat and a considerable amount of yawning behaviors.  Due 
to artifact during resting asymmetry recording, four participants were excluded from 
correlational analyses for hypothesis three.   
Hypothesis One: Relationships Between BIS, BAS, and Time Perception 
Results for evaluation of assumptions of normality indicated a positively skewed 
leptokurtic distribution of BAS Reward Responsiveness, which was corrected by 
excluding two univariate outliers on BAS Reward Responsiveness from analysis. This 
and initial exclusions due to noncompliance with task resulted in a total sample n of 36 
participants for correlation analysis.  Power analysis indicated that this sample size 
would yield power of 56% for a medium-sized effect (ρ = .3). 
In order to determine the relationship between BIS, BAS, and overestimation 
tendencies according to stimulus valence, directional correlation analyses were 
performed.  Basic descriptive statistics and zero-order correlation coefficients between 
BIS, BAS subscales, and overestimation bias scores are presented in Table 1.  Self-
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reported BAS Total (BAS TOT) scores (M = 21.91, SD = 5.13) were significantly, 
positively correlated with overestimation bias scores (OEPos) for positive stimuli (M = 
49.35, SD = 24.70), r = .292, n = 36, p = .0421, 90% CI [0.014, 0.53].  Self-reported 
BAS Drive (BAS D) scores (M = 10.07, SD = 3.22) were significantly, positively 
correlated with OEPos (M = 49.35, SD = 24.70), r = .312, n = 36, p = .0320, 90% CI 
[0.036, 0.54].  These findings support the hypothesis that higher BAS scores would be 
associated with the tendency to overestimate positive “Go” stimuli.  On the other hand, 
self-reported BIS scores (M = 15.42, SD = 3.73) were not significantly correlated with 
overestimation bias scores (OENeg) for negative stimuli (M = 53.068, SD = 27.49), r = 
.056, n = 36, p = .373, 95% CI [-0.277, 0.377].  There was insufficient evidence to 
support the hypothesis that higher BIS scores would be associated with the tendency to 
overestimate negative “Go” stimuli. 
Significant correlations were found between BAS TOT and all BAS subscales, 
BAS RR (r = .440, n = 36, p = .004), BAS D (r = .874, n = 36, p < .001), and BAS FS (r = 
.811, n = 36, p < .001).  Other significant positive correlations were found between BAS 
subscales, BAS D and BAS Fun-Seeking (BAS FS) (r = .464, n = 36, p = .002), as well 
as BAS RR and BAS FS (r = .325, n = 36, p = .027).  A significant positive correlation 
was also found between behavioral overestimation bias scores, OEPos and OENeg (r = 
.574, n = 36, p < .001). 
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Table 1. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and overestimation bias scores. 
  OEPos OENeg BIS BAS 
     TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS        
 D       .464** 
 RR      .187 .325* 
 TOT     .440** .874** .811** 
BIS     -.019 .171 -.131 .073 
OENeg    .056 .212 .110 .262 .063 
OEPos   .574** .155 .292* .025 .312* .186 
Mean  49.352 53.068 15.420 21.910 4.580 10.070 7.260 
SD  24.696 27.487 3.730 5.131 0.879 3.217 2.381 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking, OEPos = Overestimation Bias Scores Positive Go Stimuli, OENeg = 
Overestimation Bias Scores Negative Go Stimuli. 
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In order to further investigate the relationship between BIS, BAS, and 
overestimation tendencies according to stimulus valence, correlation analyses were 
performed after stratifying data by sex.  This was done in response to observations that 
women tended to have higher positive overestimation bias scores (M = 50.557, SD = 
28.568) compared to men (M = 43.936, SD = 12.462), as well as higher negative 
overestimation bias scores (M = 54.783, SD = 28.677) compared to men (M = 47.943, 
SD = 23.813). There were also far fewer men than women who participated in this 
study, and most of the men participated over the summer as a way to earn extra credit 
in class, making their motivation for participating in this study different than that of those 
who participated over the fall semester for course credit.  It was also observed that 
many of the men participating in this study were athletes who underwent the experiment 
after enduring athletic conditioning practices over the summer, causing fatigue and 
questionable motivation to complete the task.  Basic descriptive statistics and zero-
order correlation coefficients between BIS, BAS subscales, and overestimation bias 
scores for women are presented in Table 2.  Self-reported BAS D scores (M = 11.000, 
SD = 3.142) were significantly, positively correlated with OEPos (M = 50.557, SD = 
28.568), r = .345, n = 28, p = .0360, 90% CI [0.073, 0.57].  This finding supports the 
hypothesis that higher BAS scores would be associated with the tendency to 
overestimate positive “Go” stimuli.  No other significant correlations were found.  There 
was insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that higher BIS scores would be 
associated with the tendency to overestimate negative “Go” stimuli.  
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Table 3 presents correlational data between men’s self-reported BIS and BAS 
scores and overestimation bias scores. No significant correlations were found, 
indicating insufficient evidence to support hypothesis one. 
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Table 2. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and overestimation bias scores for women. 
  OEPos OENeg BIS BAS 
     TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS        
 D       .583** 
 RR      .125 .446** 
 TOT     .605** .808** .877** 
BIS     .473** .494** .346* .281 
OENeg    .206 .189 -.018 .275 .126 
OEPos   .609** .277 .258 -.077 .345* .254 
Mean  50.557 54.783 14.630 23.410 5.000 11.000 7.410 
SD  28.568 28.677 4.030 6.026 2.140 3.142 2.500 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking, OEPos = Overestimation Bias Scores Positive Go Stimuli, OENeg = 
Overestimation Bias Scores Negative Go Stimuli. 
  
44 
 
Table 3. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and overestimation bias scores for men. 
  OEPos OENeg BIS BAS 
     TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS        
 D       .431 
 RR      .543* .468 
 TOT     .712** .838** .834** 
BIS     -.285 -.103 -.562* .038 
OENeg    -.121 .269 .497 .299 .016 
OEPos   .560* -.031 .163 .203 .333 -.092 
Mean  43.9356 47.943 18.310 20.230 4.770 8.000 7.460 
SD  12.462 23.813 2.689 4.885 0.927 2.483 2.570 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking, OEPos = Overestimation Bias Scores Positive Go Stimuli, OENeg = 
Overestimation Bias Scores Negative Go Stimuli. 
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Hypothesis Two: Personality, Affective States, and the N2 
 In order to investigate the hypothesis that N2 amplitudes would be greater (more 
negative) in response to “NoGo” than to “Go” stimuli presentations, directional paired 
samples t-test was performed. Due to artifact, eight participants were excluded from this 
analysis, leaving n of 37.  Power analysis indicated that this sample size would yield 
power of 57% for a medium-sized effect (ρ = .3).  As expected, N2 amplitudes were 
significantly greater (more negative) in response to “NoGo” stimuli (M = -7.136 
microvolts, SD =4.0364) than in response to “Go” stimuli (M = -6.118 microvolts, SD = 
3.379), t(36) = 1.886, p = 0.0335, 90% CI [0.106, 1.929].  This finding supports the 
hypothesis that “NoGo” N2 amplitudes would be more negative than “Go” N2 
amplitudes. 
 N2d difference waves were calculated in order to serve as the dependent 
variable in analyses of covariance across Go and NoGo conditions.  Go and NoGo 
Grand averages for N2 amplitudes for positive and negative conditions are presented in 
Figures 4 and 6, respectively.  Grand averages for N2d waves for positive and negative 
conditions are presented in Figures 5 and 7, respectively.  GLM ANCOVAs were 
conducted to evaluate the influence of emotional valence (positive or negative) and 
duration (280ms, 490ms, 700ms, 910ms, and 1120ms) of stimuli presentation on N2 
amplitude across Go and NoGo conditions while taking into consideration covariates of 
BIS and BAS personality traits.  There was a significant emotion x BIS Total interaction, 
F(1, 20) = 7.028, p = .015 for 280ms condition, and a significant emotion x BAS Total 
interaction, F(1, 22) = 4.602, p = .043 for 910ms condition. 
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No other main effects or interactions were observed.  In order to examine the 
significant interactions observed for the 280ms condition and the 910ms condition, two 
separate post hoc correlation analyses were completed involving emotional valence 
(positive and negative) and corresponding scores on BIS and BAS.  For the 280ms 
condition, directional post hoc correlation analyses indicated that the N2d for positive 
stimuli at the 280ms condition (P1611) (M =-11.455 microvolts, SD = 16.648) had a 
strong zero-order correlation in the opposite direction as hypothesized with participants’ 
BIS Total self-report scores (M = 15.330 microvolts, SD = 3.397), r = .549, n = 24, p = 
.967, 95% CI [0.187, 0.780], while the N2d for negative stimuli at the 280ms condition 
(N1611) (M = -10.962 microvolts, SD = 14.544) did not significantly or strongly correlate 
with BIS Total.  While these findings are in opposition to the hypothesis that greater BIS 
scores would be associated with increased N2d amplitudes for negative stimuli, it is 
interesting to note that the correlation between BIS scores and N2d for positive stimuli 
at this duration would have reached significance if the directional hypothesis was 
predicted correctly.  Figure 8 illustrates NoGo and Go N2 amplitudes during the 280ms 
duration condition for positive stimuli presentation, while Figure 10 illustrates the same 
information for negative stimuli presentation.  Figures 9 and 11 illustrate N2d waves 
during the 280ms duration condition for positive and negative stimuli presentation, 
respectively. 
For the 910ms condition, directional post hoc correlation analyses indicated that 
the N2d for negative stimuli at the 910ms condition (N1914) (M =-10.846 microvolts, SD 
= 8.380) had a strong zero-order correlation in the opposite direction as hypothesized 
with participants’ BAS Total self-report scores (M = 23.230 microvolts, SD = 5.101), r = 
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.496, n = 26, p = .995, 95% CI [0.134, 0.741],while the N2d for positive stimuli at the 
910ms condition (M = -11.591 microvolts, SD = 11.731) did not significantly or strongly 
correlate with BAS Total.  These findings are in opposition to the hypothesis that greater 
BAS scores would be associated with increased N2d amplitudes for positive stimuli 
presentation, but it is again important to note that the strong correlation would have 
reached significance if the directional hypotheses were correctly predicted and also if 
non-directional hypotheses were employed. Figure 12 illustrates NoGo and Go N2 
amplitudes during the 910ms duration condition for positive stimuli presentation, while 
Figure 14 illustrates the same information for negative stimuli presentation.  Figures 13 
and 15 illustrate N2d waves during the 910ms duration condition for positive and 
negative stimuli presentation, respectively. 
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Figure 5. N2d (NoGo-Go) Grand Average for Positive Condition at Electrode FZ 
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Figure 4. Go and NoGo N2 ERP Grand Averages for Positive Condition at Electrode FZ 
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Figure 7. N2d (NoGo-Go) Grand Average for Negative Condition at Electrode FZ 
  
Legend 
N2d Grand Average 
ms 
 
0.0 250.0 500.0 750.0 1000.0 
µV 0.0 
2.5 
5.0 
7.5 
10.0 
12.5 
-2.5 
-5.0 
-7.5 
-10.0 
-12.5 
Figure 6. Go and NoGo N2 ERP Grand Averages for Negative Condition at 
Electrode FZ 
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Figure 9. N2d (NoGo-Go) Grand Average for 280ms Positive Condition at Electrode FZ 
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Figure 8. Go and NoGo N2 ERP Grand Averages for 280ms Positive Condition at 
Electrode FZ 
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Figure 11. N2d (NoGo-Go) Grand Average for 280ms Negative Condition at Electrode FZ 
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Figure 10. Go and NoGo N2 ERP Grand Averages for 280ms Negative Condition at 
Electrode FZ 
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Figure 13. N2d (NoGo-Go) Grand Average for 910ms Positive Condition at Electrode FZ 
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Figure 12. Go and NoGo N2 ERP Grand Averages for 910ms Positive Condition at 
Electrode FZ 
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Figure 15. N2d (NoGo-Go) Grand Average for 910ms Negative Condition at Electrode FZ 
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Figure 14. Go and NoGo N2 ERP Grand Averages for 910ms Negative Condition at 
Electrode FZ 
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Hypothesis Three: Personality and Resting Asymmetry 
 Results for evaluation of assumptions of normality indicated a positively skewed 
leptokurtic distribution of resting frontal activity, which was corrected with natural 
logarithmic transformations.  Initial exclusions due to artifact resulted in a total sample n 
of 42 participants for correlation analysis. Power analysis indicated that this sample size 
would yield power of 62% for a medium-sized effect (ρ = .3). 
 Frontal asymmetry scores were calculated for overall alpha power, as well as for 
high, medium, and low alpha by subtracting left alpha power scores from right alpha 
power scores at frontal electrodes (ln[alpha power at F4 electrode] – ln[alpha power at 
F3 electrode]). Since the inverse of this asymmetry score is thought to represent 
increased brain activity, negative scores are thought to reflect greater relative right 
hemisphere EEG activity, whereas positive scores reflect greater relative left activity 
(Davidson, 1988).  Frontal asymmetry data were collected from comfortably-seated 
participants during four one-minute eyes open and eyes closed phases. During the eyes 
open phases, participants were asked to relax and sit still while naturally looking forward 
for one minute durations. During the eyes closed phases, participants were asked to 
relax and naturally close their eyes while continuing to relax and sit still for one minute 
durations.  These phase alternated as follows: eyes open (EO1), eyes closed (EC1), 
eyes open (EO2), and eyes closed (EC2).  
In order to determine the relationship between BIS, BAS, and frontal asymmetry, 
directional correlation analyses were performed.  Basic descriptive statistics and zero-
order correlation coefficients between BIS, BAS subscales, and overall alpha 
asymmetry scores are presented in Table 4.  Self-reported BAS Drive (BAS D) scores 
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(M = 10.13, SD = 3.25) were significantly, positively correlated with EO1 (M = .0573 
microvolts, SD = .158), r = .267, n = 42, p = .044, 95% CI [0.010, 0.491]. These findings 
lend support to the hypothesis that higher self-reported BAS scores would be 
associated with greater relative left hemisphere EEG activation. No other significant 
correlations were found between other BAS subscales and asymmetry scores, nor were 
significant correlations found between BIS scores and asymmetry scores for overall 
alpha power (8-12 Hz).  
In order to further investigate hypothesis 3, alpha power was separated by high, 
middle, and low alpha asymmetry scores.  Table 5 provides basic descriptive statistics 
and zero-order correlations between BIS and BAS self-report scores and high alpha 
asymmetry scores. No significant correlations were found between these variables. 
Table 6 provides basic descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between the 
same self-report variables and medium alpha asymmetry scores.   A significant positive 
correlation was found between BAS D (M = 10.130, SD = 3.245) and middle alpha 
asymmetry during the EO1 condition (M = .0658 microvolts, SD = .196), r = .259, n = 
42, p = .049, 90% CI [0.0225, 0.468].  This finding suggests greater relative left frontal 
EEG activity is correlated with increased BAS D self-report scores, which supports the 
hypothesis that increased BAS self-reports scores would be associated with greater left 
frontal asymmetry.  Table 7 presents basic descriptive statistics and zero-order 
correlations between the same self-report variables and low alpha asymmetry scores.  
No significant correlations were found. 
  
56 
 
Table 4. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and overall alpha (8-12 Hz) asymmetry scores. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .488** 
 RR        .178 .427** 
 TOT       .599** .819** .833** 
BIS       .195 .366** -.019 .210 
EO2      .006 -.078 -.159 -.046 -.007 
EO1     .733** -.037 .159 -.205 .267* .108 
EC2    .740** .702** -.0580 .142 .070 .137 .165 
EC1   .810** .708** .613** -.094 .141 -.153 .207 .118 
Mean  .0953 .0938 .0573 .0462 15.690 22.490 4.930 10.130 7.420 
SD  0.171 .208 .158 .157 4.033 5.849 1.864 3.245 2.491 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking,EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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Table 5. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and high alpha asymmetry scores. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .488** 
 RR        .178 .427** 
 TOT       .599** .819** .833** 
BIS       .195 .366** -.019 .210 
EO2      -.080 .052 -.035 .071 .038 
EO1     .714** -.005 .100 -.030 .171 .001 
EC2    .533** .518** -.194 .174 -.083 .175 .189 
EC1   .705** .497** .367** -.172 .172 -.111 .238 .116 
Mean  .0756 .0849 .0506 .0338 15.690 22.490 4.930 10.130 7.420 
SD  0.181 .230 .209 .198 4.033 5.849 1.864 3.245 2.491 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking,EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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Table 6. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and middle alpha asymmetry scores. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .488** 
 RR        .178 .427** 
 TOT       .599** .819** .833** 
BIS       .195 .366** -.019 .210 
EO2      -.017 -.152 -.210 -.152 .009 
EO1     .580** .026 .158 -.285 .259* .164 
EC2    .675** .608** -.053 .087 -.214 .115 .164 
EC1   .720** .606** .536** -.095 .230 -.142 .252 .242 
Mean  .1037 .0751 .0658 .0514 15.690 22.490 4.930 10.130 7.420 
SD  0.195 .241 .196 .195 4.033 5.849 1.864 3.245 2.491 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking,EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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Table 7. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and low alpha asymmetry scores. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .488** 
 RR        .178 .427** 
 TOT       .599** .819** .833** 
BIS       .195 .366** -.019 .210 
EO2      .325 .070 -.044 .035 .130 
EO1     .445** .006 .125 -.040 .129 .119 
EC2    .415** .316* .163 -.068 -.054 -.104 .026 
EC1   .769** .514** .356** .069 -.033 -.205 .040 .000 
Mean  .0875 .112 .0528 .0362 15.690 22.490 4.930 10.130 7.420 
SD  .206 .230 .204 .208 4.033 5.849 1.864 3.245 2.491 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking,EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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To further investigate these conflicting findings, data were stratified by sex and 
directional correlation analyses were repeated separately. Table 8 illustrates 
correlations between BIS and BAS self-report scores and overall alpha asymmetry 
scores for women. Significant positive correlations were found between BAS D self-
report scores (M = 11.00, SD = 3.142) and EO1 overall alpha asymmetry scores (M = 
.0605 microvolts, SD = .174), r = .348, n = 31, p = .028, 90% CI [0.052, 0.588], as well 
as between BAS D (M = 11.00, SD = 3.142) and EC1 (M = .0835 microvolts, SD = 
.165), ), r = .341, n = 31, p = .030, 90% CI [0.044, 0.582].  These findings indicate 
greater relative left asymmetry was associated with greater BAS self-report scores, 
which supports hypothesis three.   
Alpha power was again separated into high, medium, and low power for women.  
Table 9 shows correlations for high alpha power.  Significant positive correlations were 
found between BAS TOT (M = 23.410, SD = 6.026) and high alpha power asymmetry 
scores EC1 (M = .0689 microvolts, SD = .175), r = .308, n = 31, p = .046, 90% CI 
[0.0075, 0.558], as well as between BAS D (M = 11.00, SD = 3.142) and EC1 (M = 
.0689 microvolts, SD = .175), r = .307, n = 31, p = .047, 90% CI [0.0064, 0.557]. These 
findings lend further support to hypothesis three.  
Table 10 shows correlational data for women’s middle alpha asymmetry scores 
with BIS and BAS self-report scores.  As a result, additional support for hypothesis three 
was found in several significant correlations. BAS TOT (M = 23.410, SD = 6.026) was 
significantly correlated with EC1 (M = .0911 microvolts, SD = .185), r = .367, n = 31, p = 
.021, CI.95 [0.015, 0.638].  In particular, BAS D (M = 11.000, SD = 3.142) was 
significantly correlated with EC1 (M = .0911 microvolts, SD = .185), r = .428, n = 31, p = 
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.008, CI.95 [0.087, 0.679], and BAS FS (M = 7.410, SD = 2.500) was significantly 
correlated with EC1 (M = .0911 microvolts, SD = .185), r = .318, n = 31, p = .040, 90% 
CI [0.0185, 0.565].  BAS D (M = 11.000, SD = 3.142) was also significantly correlated 
with EO1 (M = .0847 microvolts, SD = .208), r = .358, n = 31, p = .024, CI.95 [0.005, 
0.632]. These findings suggest that women’s self-report BAS scores, especially BAS D 
and BAS FS subscales, were positively correlated with greater relative left EEG activity, 
which supports hypothesis three. Correlational analyses were completed for low alpha 
asymmetry scores, as well, but no significant correlations were found between self-
report BIS and BAS scores and low alpha asymmetry scores for women (Table 11). 
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Table 8. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and overall alpha (8-12 Hz) asymmetry scores for women. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .583** 
 RR        .125 .446** 
 TOT       .605** .808** .877** 
BIS       .473** .494** .346* .281 
EO2      -.138 -.072 -.196 .085 -.140 
EO1     .775** -.047 .178 -.215 .348* .079 
EC2    .741** .751** -.009 .146 -.047 .160 .145 
EC1   .827** .770** .665** -.116 .267 -.085 .341* .198 
Mean  .0835 .0916 .0605 .0243 14.63 23.41 5.00 11.00 7.41 
SD  .165 .217 .174 .134 4.030 6.026 2.140 3.142 2.500 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking,EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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Table 9. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and high alpha asymmetry scores for women. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .583** 
 RR        .125 .446** 
 TOT       .605** .808** .877** 
BIS       .473** .494** .346* .281 
EO2      -.122 .088 -.082 .146 .058 
EO1     .788** .007 .119 -.009 .199 .006 
EC2    .501** .498** -.160 .233 -.035 .209 .266 
EC1   .715** .454** .414* -.192 .308* -.003 .307* .280 
Mean  .0689 .0861 .0467 .0150 14.630 23.410 5.000 11.000 7.410 
SD  .175 .225 .232 .184 4.030 6.026 2.140 3.142 2.500 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking, EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
64 
 
Table 10. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and middle alpha asymmetry scores for women. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .583** 
 RR        .125 .446** 
 TOT       .605** .808** .877** 
BIS       .473** .494** .346* .281 
EO2      -.143 -.138 -.211 -.067 -.073 
EO1     .626** .072 .189 -.327 .358* .167 
EC2    .704** .672** -.058 .029 -.262 .137 .061 
EC1   .783** .712** .525** -.140 .367* -.103 .428** .318* 
Mean  .0911 .0740 .0847 .0298 14.630 23.410 5.000 11.000 7.410 
SD  .185 .258 .208 .178 4.030 6.026 2.140 3.142 2.500 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking, EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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Table 11. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and low alpha asymmetry scores for women. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .583** 
 RR        .125 .446** 
 TOT       .605** .808** .877** 
BIS       .473** .494** .346* .281 
EO2      .141 .098 -.037 .269 -.118 
EO1     .365* -.131 .138 -.062 .243 .024 
EC2    .368** .167 .176 -.033 .000 -.056 .000 
EC1   .766** .528** .277 .051 .0150 -.172 .112 .002 
Mean  .0695 .0884 .0322 -.010 14.630 23.410 5.000 11.000 7.410 
SD  .220 .227 .224 .198 4.030 6.026 2.140 3.142 2.500 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking, EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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 The same directional correlational analyses were repeated for men (n = 11).  
Correlational data are presented in Table 12 showing relationships between BIS and 
BAS self-report scores and overall alpha asymmetry. No significant correlations were 
found between self-report data and asymmetry scores.  Table 13 shows the 
relationships between the same variables for high alpha power. Again, no significant 
correlations were found.   
Table 14 presents directional correlational data between the same variables for 
medium alpha power for men.  Men’s BAS FS scores (M = 7.460, SD = 2.570) were 
significantly positively correlated with EC2 (M = .0780 microvolts, SD = .198), r = .547, n 
= 11, p = .041, 90% CI [0.0325, 0.832], which supports hypothesis three. 
Men’s correlational data are presented for low alpha power in Table 15.  BAS FS 
(M = 7.460, SD = 2.570) was significantly positively correlated with EO1 (M = .111 
microvolts, SD = .128), r = .557, n = 11, p = .038, 90% CI [0.0468, 0.837].  BAS FS (M = 
7.460, SD = 2.570) was also significantly positively correlated with EO2 (M = .162 
microvolts, SD = .188), r = .753, n = 11, p = .004, CI.95 [0.280, 0.931].  These findings 
suggest that greater BAS FS scores were associated with greater relative left 
hemisphere activity for men, which supports hypothesis three.  
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Table 12. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and overall alpha (8-12 Hz) asymmetry scores for men. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .431 
 RR        .543* .468 
 TOT       .712** .838** .834** 
BIS       -.285 -.103 -.562* .038 
EO2      -.094 .075 -.104 -.012 .174 
EO1     .859** .131 .026 -.128 -.194 .265 
EC2    .778** .697** -.380 .170 -.215 .155 .227 
EC1   .798** .607* .509 -.375 -.116 -.502 .097 -.099 
Mean  .129 .0999 .0481 .106 18.310 20.230 4.770 8.000 7.460 
SD  .190 .191 .109 .203 2.689 4.885 .927 2.483 2.570 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking, EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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Table 13. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and high alpha asymmetry scores for men. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .431 
 RR        .543* .468 
 TOT       .712** .838** .834** 
BIS       -.285 -.103 -.562* .038 
EO2      -.369 .106 .153 .185 -.043 
EO1     .588* -.230 .055 -.217 .235 -.038 
EC2    .777** .575* -.431 -.002 -.320 .127 .000 
EC1   .690** .781** .255 -.376 -.167 -.621 .265 -.292 
Mean  .0945 .0816 .0615 .0850 18.310 20.230 4.770 8.000 7.460 
SD  .205 .256 .136 .233 2.689 4.885 .927 2.483 2.570 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking, EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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Table 14. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and middle alpha asymmetry scores for men. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .431 
 RR        .543* .468 
 TOT       .712** .838** .834** 
BIS       -.285 -.103 -.562* .038 
EO2      -.060 -.061 -.272 -.154 .135 
EO1     .661* .366 -.192 -.042 -.589 .220 
EC2    .592* .504 -.093 .397 .104 .096 .547* 
EC1   .595* .450 .521 -.270 -.026 -.348 .033 .055 
Mean  .139 .0780 .0126 .111 18.310 20.230 4.770 8.000 7.460 
SD  .228 .198 .158 .233 2.689 4.885 .927 2.483 2.570 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking, EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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Table 15. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between BIS Total, BAS Total, BAS Subscales, 
and low alpha asymmetry scores for men. 
  EC1 EC2 EO1 EO2 BIS BAS 
       TOT RR D FS 
BAS FS          
 D         .431 
 RR        .543* .468 
 TOT       .712** .838** .834** 
BIS       -.285 -.103 -.562* .038 
EO2      .376 .440 -.077 .021 .753** 
EO1     .669* .230 .411 .164 .087 .557* 
EC2    .602* .565* -.230 -.011 -.334 .053 .057 
EC1   .796** .310 .514 -.306 -.069 -.470 .124 -.055 
Mean  .138 .179 .111 .162 18.310 20.230 4.770 8.000 7.460 
SD  .155 .236 .128 .188 2.689 4.885 .927 2.483 2.570 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System Total, BAS TOT = Behavioral Activation 
System Total, BAS RR = Behavioral Activation System Reward Responsiveness, BAS 
D = Behavioral Activation System Drive, BAS FS = Behavioral Activation System Fun 
Seeking, EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition. 
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Exploratory Analyses 
 Additional post hoc correlational analyses were conducted between other self-
reported scores related to impulsivity, sensation-seeking tendencies, and traditional 
personality traits.  Table 16 shows relationships between Mini-IPIP subscales and 
overestimation bias scores.  No significant correlations were found between these 
variables. Table 17 shows relationships between Sensation-Seeking Scale scores and 
overestimation bias scores. OENeg (M = 52.983, SD = 27.338) was significantly 
negatively correlated with Disinhibition (ZDis) subscale scores (M = 20.000, SD = 
5.126), r = -.293, n = 37, p = .039, 90% CI [-0.525, -0.0197].  No significant correlations 
were found between Barratt Impulsiveness subscale scores and overestimation bias 
scores (Table 18).  Post hoc correlational analyses were also conducted between 
overestimation bias scores and resting frontal asymmetry scores. Tables 19-22 present 
these data.  Only one significant correlation was found between HEO1 (M = 0.0506, SD 
= 0.210) and OENeg (M = 52.983, SD = 27.338), r = .332, n = 36, p = .024, 95% CI 
[0.004, 0.595]. 
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Table 16. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between Mini-IPIP subscale scores and 
overestimation bias scores. 
 OEPos OENeg E      A C N            I 
I        
N       .075 
C      .070 -.308* 
A     -.045 .117 .245 
E    .402** .073 -.081 -.001 
OENeg   -.169 .013 -.161 .111 -.099 
OEPos  .597** -.133 -.059 -.251 .097 -.014 
Mean 48.815 52.983 20.240 22.400 20.000 12.560 22.530 
SD 25.339 27.338 4.787 2.957 5.126 4.071 3.395 
        
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. I = Intellect, N = Neuroticism, C = Conscientiousness, A = Agreeableness, E = 
Extraversion, OEPos = Overstimation Bias Scores Positive Go Stimuli, OENeg = 
Overestimation Bias Scores Negative Go Stimuli. 
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Table 17. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between Zuckerman Sensation-Seeking 
subscale scores and overestimation bias scores. 
 OEPos OENeg ZBS     ZES ZDis      ZTAS      ZTot 
ZTot        
ZTAS       .546** 
ZDis      -.067 .627** 
ZES     -.028 .260* .545** 
ZBS    .136 .499** -.118 .576** 
OENeg   -.155 .232 -.293* -.053 -.139 
OEPos  .597** .048 .219 -.058 .012 .071 
Mean 48.815 52.983 20.240 22.400 20.000 12.560 22.530 
SD 25.339 27.338 4.787 2.957 5.126 4.071 3.395 
        
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. ZTot = Zuckerman Total, ZTAS = Thrill and Adventure-Seeking, ZDis = 
Disinhibition, ZES = Experience-Seeking, ZBS = Boredom Susceptibility, OEPos = 
Overstimation Bias Scores Positive Go Stimuli, OENeg = Overestimation Bias Scores 
Negative Go Stimuli. 
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Table 18. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between Barratt Impulsiveness subscale 
scores and overestimation bias scores. 
 OEPos OENeg BCC BSC BP    BM         BCI       BA      BTot 
BTot          
BA         .008 
BCI        -.157 -.048 
BM       -.006 -.004 .386** 
BP      .119 -.038 .021 .693** 
BSC     .137 -.106 -.463** -.356* .466** 
BCC    .242 -.056 -.197 -.189 -.131 .247 
OENeg   -.060 -.280 -.064 .004 .067 -.052 -.244 
OEPos  .597** .300 .064 -.265 -.122 -.201 .023 -.139 
Mean 48.815 52.983 11.070 13.98 11.55 17.32 7.14 12.55 79.59 
SD 25.339 27.338 1.421 
 
2.51 1.934 
 
2.154 1.679 1.704 5.059 
          
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. BTot = Barratt Total, BA = Attention, BCI = Cognitive Instability, BM = Motor, BP = 
Perseverance, BSC = Self-Control, BCC = Cognitive Complexity, OEPos = 
Overstimation Bias Scores Positive Go Stimuli, OENeg = Overestimation Bias Scores 
Negative Go Stimuli. 
  
75 
 
Table 19. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between overall alpha (8-12 Hz) asymmetry 
scores and overestimation bias scores. 
 OEPos OENeg EC1     EC2      EO1          EO2 
EO2       
EO1      .733** 
EC2     .740** .702** 
EC1    .810** .708** .613** 
OENeg   -.028 -.062 .125 -.014 
OEPos  .597** -.113 -.125 -.011 -.078 
Mean 48.815 52.983 .0953 .0938 .0573 .0462 
SD 25.339 27.338 .171 .2015 .158 .157 
       
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition, OEPos = 
Overstimation Bias Scores Positive Go Stimuli, OENeg = Overestimation Bias Scores 
Negative Go Stimuli. 
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Table 20. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between high alpha asymmetry scores and 
overestimation bias scores. 
 OEPos OENeg EC1     EC2      EO1          EO2 
EO2       
EO1      .714** 
EC2     .533** .518** 
EC1    .705** .497** .367** 
OENeg   .171 -.015 .332* .208 
OEPos  .597** -.013 .029 .198 .154 
Mean 48.815 52.983 .0756 .0849 .0506 .0338 
SD 25.339 27.338 .181 .230 .209 .198 
       
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition, OEPos = 
Overstimation Bias Scores Positive Go Stimuli, OENeg = Overestimation Bias Scores 
Negative Go Stimuli. 
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Table 21. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between middle alpha asymmetry scores and 
overestimation bias scores. 
 OEPos OENeg EC1     EC2      EO1          EO2 
EO2       
EO1      .580** 
EC2     .675** .608** 
EC1    .720** .606** .536** 
OENeg   -.015 -.067 .028 -.143 
OEPos  .597** -.059 -.148 -.048 -.157 
Mean 48.815 52.983 .1037 .0751 .0658 .0514 
SD 25.339 27.338 .195 .241 .196 .195 
       
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition, OEPos = 
Overstimation Bias Scores Positive Go Stimuli, OENeg = Overestimation Bias Scores 
Negative Go Stimuli. 
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Table 22. 
Correlation matrix showing relationships between low alpha asymmetry scores and 
overestimation bias scores. 
 OEPos OENeg EC1     EC2      EO1          EO2 
EO2       
EO1      .445** 
EC2     .415** .316** 
EC1    .769** .514** .356** 
OENeg   -.176 -.071 -.061 -.093 
OEPos  .597** -.113 -.125 -.011 -.078 
Mean 48.815 52.983 .0875 .1122 .0528 .0362 
SD 25.339 27.338 .206 .230 .204 .208 
       
*p < .05; **p < .01 
Note. EC1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes closed 1 condition, EC2 = alpha 
asymmetry score for eyes closed 2 condition, EO1 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes 
open 1 condition, EO2 = alpha asymmetry score for eyes open 2 condition, OEPos = 
Overstimation Bias Scores Positive Go Stimuli, OENeg = Overestimation Bias Scores 
Negative Go Stimuli. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
 The purpose of the present study was three-fold: 1. To examine the relationship 
between levels of BIS and BAS, emotion, and perceived stimulus duration. 2. To use an 
affective Go/NoGo task to compare the effects that BIS and BAS, stimulus duration, and 
stimulus valence have on the inhibitory N2 ERP component. 3. To replicate findings of 
BIS and BAS resting asymmetry correlates.   
 Summary of Results. The main findings related to hypothesis one included 
significant correlations between overestimation bias scores and BIS and BAS self-report 
scores.  Hypothesis one posited that higher BAS scores would be associated with 
greater overestimation bias scores for positive stimuli presentation, based on previous 
findings in the literature that visual emotional stimuli evoked arousal, and higher BAS 
scores were associated with sensitivity to reward and positive emotionality while BIS 
was associated with sensitivity to anxiety, novelty, and punishment. The second part of 
hypothesis one was that higher BIS scores would be associated with greater 
overestimation bias scores for negative stimuli presentation on the same premise.  
While both positive and negative stimuli presentation did elicit overestimation biases as 
predicted, findings indicated that higher BAS scores were associated with 
overestimation bias scores for both negative and positive stimuli presentation, while BIS 
scores were not significantly correlated with overestimation bias scores. BAS Drive 
subscale scores were main contributors to this partial support of hypothesis one, and 
while these self-report scores were significantly correlated with overestimation bias 
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scores for both positive and negative stimuli presentation, the association was stronger 
for positive stimuli presentation.  When data for hypothesis one were stratified by sex, 
women’s BAS Drive scores were significantly correlated with overestimation bias scores 
for positive stimuli presentation, while no such relationship was evidenced for men’s 
BAS subscale scores.  This may indicate the need to test for sex-related differences in 
affective time perception according to personality traits in the future. 
 Support for the first part of hypothesis two was found, which stated that N2 
amplitudes would be greater in response to “NoGo” than to “Go” stimuli presentations, 
indicating that the novel affective Go/NoGo task successfully elicited the N2 component 
thought to be associated with inhibition. Partial support for the second part of hypothesis 
two was observed. It was hypothesized that higher BIS scores would be associated with 
greater N2d difference waves for negative stimuli presentation and higher BAS scores 
would be associated with greater N2d difference waves for positive stimuli presentation.  
Indeed, N2d difference waves differentiated across personality trait levels; however, 
higher BIS Total scores were associated with higher N2d amplitudes during positive 
stimulus presentation for 280ms, while higher BAS Total scores were associated with 
higher N2d amplitudes during negative stimuli presentation for 910ms.  These findings 
are in opposition to previous findings indicating stronger neurophysiological responses 
of high BAS and BIS scorers to positive and negative stimuli presentation, respectively 
(Balconi et al., 2009). 
 Results were mixed from hypothesis three, which posited that higher BIS scores 
would be associated with greater relative right frontal hemisphere EEG activity while 
higher BAS scores would be associated with greater relative left frontal hemisphere 
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EEG activity.  BAS Drive scores were consistently and strongly correlated with greater 
relative left hemisphere asymmetry. Some correlational anomalies were found, such as 
higher BAS RR scores for women and men (separately) were associated with greater 
relative right hemisphere asymmetry at middle alpha power, along with the finding that 
higher BIS was associated with greater relative left hemisphere activity for analyses 
including all participants in the low alpha level.  Another mixed finding was that greater 
BAS D was associated with greater relative right hemisphere activity for men at the 
middle alpha power level. In general, the data for women were more consistent with 
previous research in that BAS D was associated with greater relative left hemisphere 
asymmetry, while the opposite was found for men.  These differences should be 
interpreted with caution as the data for men were suspect in part due to a low sample 
size and also due to the sampling bias of summer athletes who were fatigued, most 
likely poorly motivated, and most likely experiencing greater levels of negative mood. 
 Partial Support for Arousal-Based Models of Time Perception.  Results from 
hypothesis one indicated that regardless of stimulus valence, the tendency to 
overestimate time duration was associated with higher BAS self-report scores, 
especially BAS Drive.  BAS Drive items are used to assess a participant’s strong and 
quick persistence to obtain goals.  Perhaps this trait in particular is a measure of 
baseline arousal levels on which people vary their perceptions of time passing for even 
very quick durations.  It has been discussed in the literature that visual emotional stimuli 
evokes arousal, theoretically speeding up the internal clock via the pacemaker 
mechanism. Findings from the present study may suggest that BAS Drive trait is 
sensitive to the pacemaker.  These findings are generally in line with previous 
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personality research indicating that people who scored higher on extraversion trait were 
more likely to overestimate durations of time than to make underestimations. Making 
underestimations would have been supportive of attentional-based models of time 
perception, while making overestimations as was demonstrated in extraverts supported 
an arousal-based model of time perception (Davidson & House, 1982; Rammsayer, 
1997; Zakay, Lomranz, & Kaziniz, 1984). 
 Significant positive relationships between BAS D and greater relative left 
hemisphere activity during baseline EEG recording also offer support for arousal-based 
models of time perception.  Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory assumes that individual 
differences in resting cortical arousal are reflective of enduring personality traits.  The 
finding that BAS D was indeed associated with greater relative left hemisphere activity 
thus supports arousal-based models of time perception in that these individual 
differences were observed while participants were not attending to any visual or 
auditory stimuli.  No evidence was found supporting the hypothesis that BIS trait would 
be associated with greater relative right hemisphere asymmetry, suggesting several 
possibilities. One such possibility is that BIS trait may be more sensitive to attentional 
factors instead of arousal; however, this consideration cannot be determined from the 
current study due to sampling limitations.  Several anomalies were observed that were 
contrary to previous research, including the finding that BAS D for men was associated 
with greater relative right hemisphere activity perhaps highlighting a sampling limitation 
or may be indicative of potential sex-related differences that could be further 
investigated in future research. 
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 From a clinical perspective, it is interesting to note that BAS was associated with 
overestimation of positive and negative stimuli.  Individuals with elevated BAS typically 
engage in positive, approach-related behavior, and are generally thought of as less 
anxious or fearful than individuals with elevated BIS.  Although only speculatory, it is 
possible that individuals with elevated BAS (and associated left hemisphere cortical 
arousal patterns) are somewhat resilient to the effects of negative stimuli.  In contrast, 
individuals with elevated BIS are thought to experience positive stimuli somewhat 
differently, to the extent that it could actually be perceived as negative.  Although only in 
infant stages, there is a line of research that suggests that individuals with elevated BIS 
are less adherent to simple medical treatments (i.e. positive stimuli) that could improve 
quality of life and prevent long-term medical complications (Moran, Everhart, Davis, 
Wuensch, Lee & Demaree, 2011). 
Greater N2 amplitudes for NoGo stimuli in general indicated an inhibitory 
response to emotionally incongruent stimuli as expected.  The presence of the N2 
indicates participants’ use of orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices, and reflects 
inhibition on a premotor level.  Since previous research indicated that higher BAS and 
BIS scores were associated with more intense orientation and responses to positive and 
negative stimuli respectively, it was originally hypothesized that higher BAS self-report 
scores would be associated with greater N2d responses to positive stimuli while higher 
BIS self-report scores would be associated with greater N2d responses to negative 
stimuli assuming an arousal-based model of time perception.  However, BIS Total 
scores were associated with greater N2d responses to positive stimuli, perhaps 
suggesting that positive stimuli were being perceived as relatively novel experiences to 
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participants’ general perception styles.  BAS Total scores on the other hand were 
associated with greater N2d responses to negative stimuli, again suggesting an 
orientation to novel stimuli that were incongruent to participants’ general perception 
styles.  These findings are contrary to arousal-based models of time perception and 
past research involving individual differences (Tipples, 2008), and indeed may be 
indicative of attentional mechanisms involved in time perception.   
Tipples (2008) found support for arousal-based time perception models, in that 
negative emotionality was associated with overestimations of angry and fearful stimuli 
presentation durations.  It was suggested that attentional effects were not observed in 
that study because they were mediated by emotional arousal through noradrenaline, 
which affects the operation of both attentional and time processes, and is also thought 
to facilitate orienting and slower disengagement of attention.  Since the current study 
found results in opposition to arousal-based models of time perception, perhaps the 
Go/NoGo task tapped the previously-described attentional mechanisms that were 
sensitive to both noradrenergic and dopaminergic pathways that are implicated in BIS 
and BAS, respectively.  Of note, the Tipples (2008) study differs fundamentally from the 
present study in two ways.  First, the former study utilized affective faces rather than 
objects (i.e., IAPS).  The negative affective faces were perceived as more arousing than 
positive affective faces.  In the present study, the perceived levels of arousal for positive 
and negative stimuli were controlled for.  To this extent, the significant effects noted 
within Tipples (2008) study may be attributable to the differences in magnitude of 
arousal between positive and negative affective faces. Second, Tipples (2008) did not 
examine BIS and BAS; rather, the EAS Temperament Survey was used (Buss & 
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Plomin, 1984)  While this survey is associated with individual differences in positive and 
negative temperament, and may overlap with BAS and BIS, there are inherent 
differences between these constructs that make direct comparison impossible. 
Furthermore, findings indicated that higher BAS scores were associated with 
greater N2d amplitudes at the negative 910ms duration condition (longer than the 
standard duration), while higher BIS scores were associated with greater N2d 
amplitudes at the positive 280ms duration condition (shorter than the standard 
duration).  Assuming that the Go/NoGo task was able to tap attentional mechanisms 
along with their respective neurophysiological pathways, perhaps individuals who score 
higher BAS are more sensitive to attentional mechanisms at relatively longer durations 
of incongruent emotional stimuli than higher BIS scorers.   
This study has advanced current understanding of time perception by integrating 
factors of emotional valence and personality characteristics. While previous research 
incorporating broad personality traits (e.g., extraversion and introversion) consists of 
conflicting findings, the current study offers results that support a more specific 
personality correlate with time overestimation tendencies known as BAS Drive.  The 
novel affective Go/NoGo time perception task was also successful at eliciting the 
inhibitory N2 component, and may be adapted for use in future research as a potential 
way to further investigate neurophysiological correlates of time perception.   
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 A major limitation to the present study was the inability to compare emotional 
conditions to neutral conditions. Including a neutral condition in future studies may help 
researchers isolate further arousal mechanisms associated with emotion.  Also finding a 
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way to measure participants’ perceptions of “NoGo” stimuli presentation durations could 
be used as a means to further elucidate the effects of inhibition on time perception.  
Since there was no comparison made between “Go” and “NoGo” overestimation bias 
scores, the current study was unable to determine what role the N2 component serves 
in arousal- or attention-based models of time perception.   
Another limitation was the amount of artifact encountered by taking N2d 
difference waves for hypothesis two. Increasing power in future studies by including 
more participants to account for this artifact may help detect findings the present study 
was unable to uncover.  Previous research has included the use of a feedback tone for 
slow responses to “Go” stimuli, which helps to elicit the N2 ERP more reliably and 
effectively. This could also be a partial solution to decrease in power due to artifact if it 
results in clearer, more negative N2 amplitudes, meaning taking the N2d difference 
wave would no longer be necessary.  The last main limitation to this study was the 
sampling bias of including summer semester students who were also student-athletes 
who were exhausted from practice by the time they arrived for participation in the study.  
Most of these student athletes were men, and stratifying data by sex for hypotheses one 
and three resulted in more consistent findings for women than men, although this could 
merely be a result of lower power for male participants in this sample, or even could 
indicate sex differences in time perception that could be further explored in the future. 
Implications of this research include continued advancement of understanding 
cognitive domains affected in many different clinical populations, including ADHD, 
Parkinson’s disease, mood disorders, and senescence as well as normal aging.  Other 
research implications include psychotherapeutic applications, emphasizing the 
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importance of taking individual differences into account during case conceptualization 
and treatment planning for patients with psychological disorders.  Greater N2d 
amplitudes for incongruent emotional stimuli according to BIS and BAS perceptive 
styles highlighted the need for clinicians to consider the manner of presentation of 
proposed treatment plans to patients in psychotherapy, in that reactions and compliance 
will most likely differ, even at the cortical level, according to personality traits.  Further 
research in these clinical areas is suggested and will help to illustrate the impact of 
individual differences on treatment outcomes. 
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BIS/BAS 
Each item of this questionnaire is a statement that a person may either agree with or disagree with.  For 
each item, indicate how much you agree or disagree with what the item says.  Please respond to all the 
items; do not leave any blank.  Choose only one response to each statement.  Please be as accurate and 
honest as you can be.  Respond to each item as if it were the only item.  That is, don't worry about being 
"consistent" in your responses.  Choose from the following four response options: 
  1 = very true for me  
  2 = somewhat true for me  
  3 = somewhat false for me  
  4 = very false for me 
_____ 1.  A person's family is the most important thing in life.  
_____ 2.  Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or nervousness.  
_____ 3.  I go out of my way to get things I want.  
_____ 4.  When I'm doing well at something I love to keep at it.  
_____ 5.  I'm always willing to try something new if I think it will be fun.  
_____ 6.  How I dress is important to me.  
_____ 7.  When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized.  
_____ 8.  Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit.  
_____ 9.  When I want something I usually go all-out to get it.  
_____ 10.  I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun. 
_____ 11.  It's hard for me to find the time to do things such as get a haircut.  
_____ 12.  If I see a chance to get something I want I move on it right away.  
_____ 13.  I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me.  
_____ 14.  When I see an opportunity for something I like I get excited right away.  
_____ 15.  I often act on the spur of the moment.  
_____ 16.  If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty "worked up."  
_____ 17.  I often wonder why people act the way they do.  
_____ 18.  When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly.  
_____ 19.  I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important.  
_____ 20.  I crave excitement and new sensations. 
_____ 21.  When I go after something I use a "no holds barred" approach.  
_____ 22.  I have very few fears compared to my friends.  
_____ 23.  It would excite me to win a contest.  
_____ 24.  I worry about making mistakes. 
 
 
APPENDIX C: MINI-IPIP SCALE 
The Mini-IPIP 
 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you.  Please write a number 
next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement.  
You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic 
applies more strongly than the other.   
 
1 = Disagree strongly 
2 = Disagree moderately 
3 = Disagree a little 
4 = Neither agree nor disagree 
5 = Agree a little 
6 = Agree moderately 
7 = Agree strongly 
 
1. I see myself as the life of the party.     ________ 
2. I sympathize with others’ feelings.    ________ 
3. I get chores done right away.     ________ 
4. I have frequent mood swings.     ________ 
5. I have a vivid imagination.     ________ 
6. I don’t talk a lot.      ________ 
7. I am not interested in other people’s problems.  ________ 
8. I often forget to put things back in their proper place. ________ 
9. I am relaxed most of the time.      ________ 
10. I am not interested in abstract ideas.    ________ 
11. I talk to a lot of different people at parties.   ________ 
12. I feel others’ emotions.     ________ 
13. I like order.       ________ 
14. I get upset easily.      ________ 
15. I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.  ________ 
16. I keep in the background.     ________ 
17. I am not really interested in others.    ________ 
18. I make a mess of things.     ________ 
19. I seldom feel blue.      ________ 
20. I do not have a good imagination.    ________ 
 
 
APPENDIX D: BARRATT IMPULSIVENESS SCALE (BIS-11) 
The Barratt Scale: BIS-11 
 
For each statement below, please rate yourself on the following scale: 
 
Rarely/Never  1 2 3 4 Always/Almost Always 
 
1. I “squirm” at plays or lectures.        
2. I am restless at the theater of lectures        
3. I don’t “pay attention”         
4. I concentrate easily          
5. I am a steady thinker          
6. I act “on impulse”          
7. I act on the spur of the moment        
8. I buy things on impulse         
9. I make up my mind quickly         
10. I do things without thinking.         
11. I spend or charge more than I earn.        
12. I am happy-go-lucky.          
13. I am a careful thinker.          
14. I plan tasks carefully.          
15. I am self-controlled.          
16. I plan trips well ahead of time.        
17. I plan for job security.          
18. I say things without thinking.         
19. I like to think about complex problems.       
20. I like puzzles.           
21. I save regularly.          
22. I am more interested in the present than the future.      
23. I get easily bored when solving thought problems.      
24. I change residences          
25. I change jobs.           
26. I am future oriented.          
27. I can only think about one problem at a time.      
28. I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking.      
29. I have “racing” thoughts.         
30. I change hobbies.          
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E: ZUCKERMAN’S SENSATION-SEEKING SCALE 
 
Zuckerman’s Scale 
For each question, please indicate which of the choices most describes your likes or the way 
you feel. When it is hard to choose, select the option that describes you best of that you 
dislike the least. 
 
1. a. I like “wild” uninhibited parties.        
b. I prefer quiet parties with good conversation. 
2. a. There are some movies I enjoy seeing a second or third time.    
b. I can’t stand watching a movie that I’ve just seen before. 
3. a. I often wish I could be a mountain climber.      
b. I can’t understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains. 
4. a. I dislike all body odors.         
b. I like some of the earthy body smells. 
5. a. I get bored seeing the same old faces.       
b. I like the comfortable familiarity of everyday friends. 
6. a. I like to explore a strange city or section of town by myself, even  
if it means getting lost.         
b. I prefer a guide when I am in a place I don’t know well. 
7. a. I dislike people who do or say things just to shock or upset others.   
b. When you can predict almost everything a person will do or say he  
must be a bore.         
 
8. a. I usually don’t enjoy a movie or play where I can predict what will    
happen in advance. 
b. I don’t mind watching a movie or play where I can predict what will 
 happen in advance. 
 
9. a. I have tried cannabis or would like to.       
b. I would never smoke cannabis. 
10. a. I would not like to try any drug which might produce strange and   
dangerous effects on me. 
b. I would like to try some of the drugs that produce hallucinations. 
110 
 
11. a. A sensible person avoids activities that are dangerous.     
b. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening. 
12. a. I dislike “swingers” (people who are uninhibited and free about sex).   
b. I enjoy the company of real “swingers”. 
13. a. I find that stimulants make me uncomfortable.      
b. I often like to get high (drinking alcohol or smoking marijuana). 
14. a. I like to try new foods that I have never tasted before.     
b. I order the dishes with which I am familiar so as to avoid  
disappointment or unpleasantness. 
 
15. a. I enjoy looking at home movies, videos, or travel slides.     
b. Looking at someone’s home movies, videos, or travel slides bores  
me tremendously. 
 
16. a. I would like to take up the sport of water skiing.      
b. I would not like to take up water skiing. 
17. a. I would like to try surfboard riding.       
b. I would not like to try surfboard riding. 
18. a. I would like to take off on a trip with no preplanned or definite  
routes or timetable.          
b. When I go on a trip I like to plan my route and timetable carefully. 
 
19. a. I prefer the “down to earth” kinds of people as friends.     
b. I would like to make friends in some of the “far out” groups like  
artists or anarchists.         
 
20. a. I would not like to learn to fly an airplane.       
b. I would like to learn to fly an airplane. 
21. a. I prefer the surface of the water to the depths.      
b. I would like to go scuba diving. 
22. a. I would like top meet some people who are homosexual (men or    
women). 
b. I stay away from anyone I suspect of being gay or lesbian. 
 
23. a. I would like to try parachute jumping.       
b. I would never want to try jumping out of an airplane, with or  
without a parachute. 
 
24. a. I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable.      
b. I prefer friends who are reliable and predictable. 
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25. a. I am not interested in experience for its own sake.      
b. I like to have new and exciting experiences and sensations even  
if they are a little frightening, unconventional, or illegal. 
 
26. a. I would not like to learn to fly an airplane.       
b. I would like to learn to fly an airplane. 
27. a. I prefer spending time in the familiar settings of home.     
b. I get very restless if I have to stay around home for any length of time. 
28. a. I like to dive off the high board.        
b. I don’t like the feeling I get standing on the high board (or I don’t  
go near it at all). 
 
29. a. I like to date people who are physically exciting.      
b. I like to date people who share my values. 
30. a. Heavy drinking usually ruins a party because some people get     
loud and boisterous. 
b. Keeping the drinks full is the key to a good party. 
 
31. a. The worst social sin is to be rude.        
b. The worst social sin is to be a bore. 
32. a. A person should have considerable sexual experience before marriage.   
b. It’s better if two married people begin their sexual experience with  
each other. 
 
33. a. Even if I had the money, I would not care to associate with flighty    
rich people in the jet set. 
b. I could conceive of myself seeking pleasures around the world with  
the jet set.  
 
34. a. I like people who are sharp and witty even if they do sometimes     
insult others. 
b. I dislike people who have their fun at the expense of hurting the  
feelings of others. 
 
35. a. There is altogether too much portrayal of sex in the movies.    
b. I enjoy watching many of the sexy scenes in movies. 
36. a. I feel best after taking a couple of drinks.       
b. Something is wrong with people who need alcohol to feel good. 
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37. a. People should dress according to some standard of taste, neatness,    
and style. 
b. People should dress in individual ways even if the effects are  
sometimes strange. 
 
38. a. Sailing long distances in small sailing crafts is foolhardy.     
b. I would like to sail a long distance in a small but seaworthy  
sailing craft. 
 
39. a. I have no patience with dull or boring people.      
b. I find something interesting in almost every person I talk to. 
40. a. Skiing down a high mountain slope is a good way to end up on     
crutches. 
b. I think I would enjoy the sensations of skiing very fast down a  
high mountain slope.
 
 
APPENDIX F: LATERAL PREFERENCE INVENTORY 
Lateral Preference Inventory 
 
Participant #:________ 
 
Circle the appropriate number after each item. 
        Right Left Both 
 
With which hand would you throw a ball to hit a target?  1 -1 0 
 
With which hand do you draw?     1 -1 0 
 
With which hand do you use an eraser on paper?   1 -1 0 
 
With which hand do you remove the top card when dealing?  1 -1 0 
 
With which foot do you kick a ball?    1 -1 0 
 
If you wanted to pick up a pebble with your toes, which foot 
would you use?       1 -1 0 
 
If you had to step up onto a chair, which foot would you place 
on the chair first?       1 -1 0 
 
Which eye would you use to peep through a keyhole?   1 -1 0 
 
If you had to look into a dark bottle to see how full it was, which 
eye would you use?      1 -1 0 
 
Which eye would you use to sight down a rifle?   1 -1 0 
 
If you wanted to listen to a conversation going on behind a closed  
door, which ear would you place against the door?   1 -1 0 
 
If you wanted to listen to someone’s heartbeat, which ear would 
you place against their chest?     1 -1 0 
 
Into which ear would you place the earphone of a transistor radio? 1 -1 0 
        
Is mother left or right hand dominant? ____ 
 
Is father left or right hand dominant? ____    
       # of Right + # of Left = Total Score 
        
 ----------  + ---------  =  -------------
 
 
 
APPENDIX G: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Participant Information 
 
Participant No.     
 
Age (in years):  Sex (please circle one):    Male      Female  Ethnicity:    
 
 
 
Medical History Questionnaire 
 
Have you ever experienced or been diagnosed with any of the following, or are you experiencing any of the 
following at present?  Please circle the appropriate response and explain any “Yes” answers below. 
 
1.  Visual difficulties, blurred vision, or eye disorders   Yes  No 
 
2.  Blindness in either eye      Yes  No 
 
3.  If Yes to either of the above, have problems been corrected  Yes  No 
 
4. Hearing problems      Yes  No 
 
5. Learning disabilities (problems of reading, writing, or  Yes  No 
 comprehension) 
 
6. Cognitive problems      Yes  No 
 
7. Severe head trauma/injury     Yes  No 
 
8.  Stroke       Yes  No 
 
9. Epilepsy or seizures      Yes  No 
  
10. Neurological surgery      Yes  No 
 
11. Paralysis       Yes  No 
 
12.  Anxiety disorders      Yes  No 
 
13. Depression       Yes  No 
 
14. Other Neurological, Psychological, or Emotional problems  Yes  No 
 
 
 
 
Please explain any “Yes” responses: 
 
              
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX H: RECRUITMENT FROM SUMMER CLASSES SCRIPT 
 
Recruitment Script 
Greetings! 
 
My name is Katie Lehockey and I am a clinical health psychology doctoral student conducting 
research to complete my thesis.  I’m here today to see if anyone is interested in participating in 
my experiment. 
 
The purpose of my research is to find out how people with different personalities may think 
about time passing when they are put in positive and negative moods.  I am also interested in 
investigating an important skill people have called inhibition.  When people have problems with 
this skill, they might end up having problems in school, jobs, and relationships.  By doing this 
research, I hope to learn how inhibition is related to time perception across different personality 
types and moods. 
 
If you are interested in participating, you will be asked to come to the Cognitive Neuroscience 
Lab in the Rawl building for two hours.  During the first half hour, you will complete some 
surveys about your personality and feelings.  The rest of the time you will be completing the 
experiment.  It is important to note that this study will use electroencephalogram (EEG).  EEG is 
a recording of your brain’s electrical activity, which is very useful for studying inhibition.   
 
If you are 18 years of age or older, right-handed, have corrected-to-normal vision, and do not 
have any neurological or psychiatric conditions like a seizure disorder, anxiety, or depression, 
then you are eligible to participate in this study.  Please indicate your interest in participating by 
printing your name and contact information on the paper provided.  I will contact you with more 
information about the study as soon as possible.  You may also contact me with any questions or 
concerns you may have about the experiment or your eligibility to participate. 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration!
 
 
APPENDIX I: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
 
General Instructions 
 
You are now ready to begin the experimental phases of this session.  You are sitting in 
a sound-proof booth, so I will be talking to you through an intercom system periodically.  
If you need something throughout the experiment, please pick up your mouse and point 
the bottom part towards the left booth where I’ll be sitting. 
It is very important that you remain still and relaxed during these sessions.  Please do 
not grind your teeth or clinch your jaw.  Please do not move your face more than usual, 
and try not to touch your face.  If you feel one of the electrodes falling off of your face or 
ears, please pick up your mouse and point the bottom part towards me. 
Part of the challenge of this experiment is for you to pay close attention at all times.  
This test can get very boring, so please try your best to stay alert and answer the items 
correctly. 
At the end of the experiment, you will complete a brief quiz about what you saw during 
testing.  You should do very well on it if you pay attention     
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Eyes Open, Eyes Closed 
For the next 4 minutes, I will be asking you to open and close your eyes over the 
intercom. 
When I ask you to open your eyes, I’d like for you keep your eyes open normally and to 
look at the computer screen in front of you. 
When I ask you to close your eyes, simply close your eyes naturally without squinting or 
moving many of your facial muscles. 
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Learning Phase Instructions 
 
During this part of the experiment, you will learn what we will refer to as the “standard 
duration.”   
You will see a series of 10 pictures.  They are all the same picture, and will be 
presented for the same amount of time.  I want you to pay close attention to the 
pictures, especially focusing on the amount of time they are displayed.  The amount of 
time each picture is displayed will be your reference point for the next tasks. 
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Practice Phase Instructions 
 
During this part of the experiment, you will learn how to do the task and practice 
responding. 
You will be presented with many different pictures, including the gray oval you saw 10 
times before.  Each of these pictures will be displayed for different amounts of time.  
Your job is to determine if each picture is displayed for an amount of time that is shorter 
or longer than the “standard duration” that you just learned.  Please indicate if you think 
each picture is presented for an amount of time that is shorter or longer than the 
“standard” by using the mouse.  If you think the picture was displayed for a shorter 
amount of time than the “standard,” press the left mouse click as soon as you see 
“Please Respond” on the screen.  If you think the answer is “longer,” press the right 
mouse click.  Only use your RIGHT hand to respond to items! 
Short = Left button 
Long = Right button 
Only respond to the pictures other than the gray oval.  When the gray oval appears for 
any duration, do not do anything when you see “Please Respond.”  Simply wait for the 
next picture to appear. 
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Test Phase Instructions (Positive-Negative) 
 
During this part of the experiment, you will do basically the same thing you did in the 
last part, but with different pictures. 
There are two trials in this part.  Each part will have pictures that will make you 
experience positive or negative feelings.   
Part 1 
During the first trial, you will see many pictures that make you experience positive 
feelings.  When you see a picture that makes you feel positive emotions, you are to 
choose if it was displayed for an amount of time that is shorter or longer than the 
“standard duration” when you see “Please Respond.”  You are to use the mouse the 
same way you did in the last part of the experiment. 
You will also see some negative pictures during this trial.  When you see pictures that 
make you feel negative emotions, do not respond when you see “Please Respond.”  
Instead, just wait for the next stimulus to appear. 
Part 2 
You will do the opposite for the second trial.  You will see many negative pictures, and 
choose whether they were displayed for an amount of time that is shorter or longer than 
the “standard duration.”  When you see positive pictures, do not respond when you see 
“Please Respond.” Just wait for the next stimulus to appear. 
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Test Phase Instructions (Negative-Positive) 
 
During this part of the experiment, you will do basically the same thing you did in the 
last part, but with different pictures. 
There are two trials in this part.  Each part will have pictures that will make you 
experience positive or negative feelings.   
Part 1 
During the first trial, you will see many pictures that make you experience negative 
feelings.  When you see a picture that makes you feel negative emotions, you are to 
choose if it was displayed for an amount of time that is shorter or longer than the 
“standard duration” when you see “Please Respond.”  You are to use the mouse the 
same way you did in the last part of the experiment. 
You will also see some positive pictures during this trial.  When you see pictures that 
make you feel positive emotions, do not respond when you see “Please Respond.”  
Instead, just wait for the next stimulus to appear. 
Part 2 
You will do the opposite for the second trial.  You will see many positive pictures, and 
choose whether they were displayed for an amount of time that is shorter or longer than 
the “standard duration.”  When you see negative pictures, do not respond when you 
see “Please Respond.” Just wait for the next stimulus to appear. 
 
